+[TODO: mention https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Intelligence_Test_of_Cultural_Homogeneity ]
+
+In the chapter on violent crime, Murray presents a table of black/white and Latino/white ratios of arrests for violent crimes in thirteen cities for which data was available. The median black/white ratio was 9.0 (that is, 9 black people arrested for violent crimes per 1 white person so arrested) and the median Latino/white ratio was 2.4.
+
+To argue that these ratios are driven by real differences in behavior rather than biased police, Murray attempts to "triangulate" the true crime rate with other data. For example, arrests for murder specifically are going to be less biased by selective enforcement or fraud: even evil and corrupt cops who don't consider themselves above, say, planting evidence of drugs, seem less likely or able to fake a human corpse. So if racial differences in murder charges match differences in violent-crime arrests more generally, that's probabilistic evidence that arrests are tracking a real difference in criminal behavior.
+
+Interestingly, Murray argues that this is true even if you don't think police are generally getting the right suspect (!!), as long as the suspect who is arrested is of the same race as the actual perpetrator, which will usually be the case given how many murders are crimes of passion where the victim and perpetrator knew each other (in highly segregated communities), or tied to gang activity (where gangs are almost always monoracial). The scenario most prone to racist police falsely accusing a black person—non-gang-related murders where the alleged perp is black and didn't know the victim—only accounted for 4% of all homocides. Meanwhile, the group ratios for murder arrests are more stark than for violent crimes more generally: a median black/white ratio of 18.1, and a median Latino/white ratio of 4.7, which is not the pattern we would expect to see if cops were using their discretionary powers to falsely imprison blacks and Latinos on lesser charges. Another source of data for triangulation is in reports of crimes _to_ the police: if crime _victims_ aren't racist in the same way the police themselves might be, then that would show up in the numbers—and it turns out that even black and Latino victims also report more black and Latino perpretrators, even in neighborhoods where they are a minority.
+
+As an argument about patterns of behavior in our own world, I find this quite convincing, but again, Murray's agnosticism about the causes of behavior limits its applicability; I expect the sophisticated advocate of structural-racism theories to be entirely unmoved. Even if the police sometimes getting the wrong man can't change the conclusion about which races do how many murders, a world in which the police sometimes get the wrong man of the same race is _exactly_ the kind of factor that would contribute to structural racism—if the System is going to treat members of your racial caste interchangeably anyway, that changes your _incentives_ to commit crime, relative to the world where people were [literally raceblind](/2021/Mar/link-see-color/). We don't know what other equilibria might be possible for a civilization with a discipline of Actual Social Science, even if there's no obvious way to jump out of our own equilibrium with the crude "policy" levers available to actualy-existing governments.
+
+(Note, "We don't know what's possible (given the exact right conditions)" is _not_ the same thing as "Anything is possible (if we all just believe in a better world)". Ignorance may be conducive to hope, but does not constitute any _specific_ hope.)
+
+At times, Murray's inability in his commentary to consider flaws in the _status quo_ seems like a blindness bordering on complicity. Of the criminal justice system, he writes:
+
+> The social scientist's view of who commits crimes is a set of snapshots—the report of a crime, an arrest, the decision to prosecute, the charge on which the suspect is tried, the outcome of the prosecution, and the sentence for a guilty plea or verdict. At each step, the authorities are usually trying to get it right, but "getting it right" means different things. Decisions to prosecute depend on many factors besides the likelihood that the arrested person committed the crime (e.g., whether these is evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt if it goes to trial). The decision about the charges that will be filed is a main bargaining chip in a plea bargain negotiation.
+
+This is all very "reasonable" by the methods and epistemology of Murray's world, and I'm afraid—not a figure of speech, really afraid—that there's nothing I could say, no words I could possibly type to explain the cruel capriciousness of that world's "reasonableness" to those who haven't personally been on the other side, who have never been abused by a total institution like the "justice" system. Two three-day stints in the psych ward are [what did it to me](/2017/Jun/memoirs-of-my-recent-madness-part-i-the-unanswerable-words/). Going to school might not be bad enough if you went to a good school.
+
+_The authorities are usually trying to get it right._ I mean, yes—_by the Authority's own corrupt standards_. The authorities are ordinary men and women trying to do their jobs as best they can. "Getting it right" means doing what's expected of people in your position by the power structure around you, which usually has _some_ connection with the written rules which are ostensibly supposed to prevent abuses of power. If the rules say that the police can't just kidnap people arbitrarily—there's paperwork to be filled out documenting _why_ an arrest was made—then, yes, the paperwork will tend to be filled out. That doesn't mean the things written on the paperwork are actually _true_.
+
+[TODO: I have paperwork from being in psych prison—yes, I know, they call it a "hospital"—that says I self-presented due to thoughts of sucide. That isn't true.]
+
+Notice how casually Murray mentions the decision of what charges are to be filed as "a main bargaining chip in a plea bargain negotiation"! As a description of the system as it actually exists, this is perfectly accurate, but it seems important to notice that the entire concept of plea bargaining is a perversion of justice. One would have hoped for a system that proportionately punishes people for the specific crimes that they _actually did_, in order to disincentivize crime. Instead, we have the Orwellian nightmare of a system that says, "We think you're guilty of something, but it'll be easier for you if you confess to being guilty of something less bad, [and swear under oath that no one threatened you to confess](http://benjaminrosshoffman.com/can-crimes-be-discussed-literally/) (!!)."
+
+In calling the current system an Orwellian nightmare, I'm _not_ saying I personally know how to do better. (If abolishing the police would just result in anarchy and mob justice, that would just be a different kind of nightmare.) I'm trying to highlight how the statistics output by the actually-existing "justice" and "education" systems need to be understood as data about what's happening _within_ the current power structure managed by these systems, and shouldn't be naïvely seen as solely reflecting an independently existing reality of "education" and "crime." If there were no schools, people would still learn things (people still _do_ learn things outside of school); if there were no law enforcement, people would still take advantage of each other (people still _do_ take advantage of each other, outside the reaches of the law).
+
+[TODO: if police use drug crimes as a plea bargaining chip because they're easier to prosecute, that may be a pragmatic adaptation to it being hard to prove real crimes, but it also sets up a situation where the police as an entity are preying on communities that use drugs]
+
+[TODO: credentialism (I'm not writing this for school, and you're not reading it for school, either)]
+
+[TODO: "But I digress" transition sentence]
+
+In the chapters on first-order effects, Murray lays out some of the immediate and knowable consequences of the group trait differences that have just been argued to exist at all. You might think that groups would have approximately the same IQs _within_ a profession, but this turns out not to be true: the gaps are either the same or larger! The reason probably differs by job: for jobs that most people are capable of, like being a janitor, employers value non-cognitive traits like conscientiousness more, and the IQ gap from the general population "carries through" to the profession.
+
+For jobs that usually require credentials, another explanation takes prominence. For decades, colleges have been applying pretty aggressive affirmative action policies, admitting black and Latino students with much weaker scores than white or Asian candidates: as far as admission to elite colleges goes, being black is an advantage equivalent to about 180 points on the SAT. That has ripple effects: elite colleges "snap up" the most talented non-Asian minorities, who then tend to come in lower in the class rankings—and this _within_-institution racial inequality perpetuates itself at less-elite institutions (which are playing the same game with the students who didn't get admitted by their first choice), and down the pipeline to graduate school and the professions. If schools applied the same standards to everyone, you wouldn't see this distortionary effect where the same credential means different things based on race—Murray notes that the U.S. military, which makes heavy use of aptitude testing, has been strikingly successful in this regard—but that would come at the cost of lopsided diversity numbers. For exceptionally cognitively demanding jobs, the competition for which H.R. or the admissions office are not given the power to meddle in, we already see this anyway: as [Larry Summers (in)famously observed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_Summers#Differences_between_the_sexes), small group differences in mean or variance result in much larger differences at the extreme tails of the distribution, such that there are just many _fewer_ non-Asian minorities who can perform at the level of elite CEOs and professors.
+
+As to crime, Murray argues that the consequences of criminality differences are a bigger deal in big cities where segregated higher-crime neighborhoods form, in contrast to smaller towns and cities that are more racially integrated simply because there aren't enough minorities to form an enclave. Businesses and real estate developers are less willing to invest in high-crime areas, and with a higher ambient threat level, police officers in those areas are incentivized to be more jumpy about the use of force.
+
+Murray wraps up with a chapter on "If We Don't Face Reality." The facts of IQ and crime differences don't imply any particular policy, but Murray wants researchers to at least be able to control for IQ as an independent variable, and for the targets of our ongoing Cultural Revolution to offer a little more resistance. Moreover, Murray contends, identity politics is an existential threat to the American system: it was one thing when just minorities thought of themselves as collective interest groups, but if the white working class picks up the same playbook, then the ideal of individualism will be truly lost within the tides of ethnic conflict. Murray identifies eliminating government-sponsored affirmative action as politically impossible, "not within our grasp", but that a partial solution would be for those on the center-left and center-right to reaffirm the American creed and the goal of equality before the law.
+
+As a child of the previous ideological regime, I'm strongly in favor of this! Unfortunately, I am not feeling optimistic about the American creed's prospects. Murray notes that the ideal of individualism is unnatural—we evolved to be loyal to our ingroup and distrust outsiders. A dominant group serving its own interests at the expense of others is the natural form of government; the American experiment—to the extent it was ever real—was the exception that required careful cultivation. But part of what made equality before the law such an effective marketing promise was the unstated premise that it would lead to, you know, _actual_ equality. If that's empirically not true—if people don't _believe_ that it's true—what happens to our Society?
+
+I don't know.
+
+----
+
+... and that's the book review that I would _prefer_ to write. A social-science review of a social-science book, for social-science nerds, in a world that wasn't _about to end_. Let me explain.
+
+When scholars like Murray write about "intelligence", they're talking about a summary of the differences _between_ humans: we can measure how well different humans perform at various verbal or spatial or mathematical thinking-tasks, and it turns out that, on average, people who are good at one thinking-task also tend to be good at others. Graph all the test scores on an appropriately high-dimensional plot, and [the longest axis of the hyperellipsoid](/2020/Apr/book-review-human-diversity/#the-length-of-a-hyperellipsoid) represents "general intelligence"—the dimension of human variation that we recognize as "smart" _vs._ "dumb."
+
+But this particular dick-measuring contest takes place in the context of a human civilization; it doesn't tell us very much about "intelligence" as a natural phenomenon—the capacity of an agent to achieve goals across a variety of environments. Maybe some humans read better than others, but from the standpoint of eternity, reading itself is a _recent_ cultural practice [(invented only 3500 years ago)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Literacy#Prehistoric_and_ancient_literacy) that piggybacks off of natural language capabilities that _all_ developmentally normal humans share. Cats and crows and octopuses _do_ have "intelligence"—various cognitive abilities that let them integrate sensory information into a model of their environment, allocate attention, execute motor plans to seek prey or avoid predators, _&c._, but you can't give them a [Stanford–Binet IQ test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford%E2%80%93Binet_Intelligence_Scales), which was designed around the _specific_ set of abilties that humans have in common. But, in principle, humans aren't special.
+
+And yet—it seems like humans _are_ special, in some ways. Of all the creatures on [the tree of life](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tree_of_life_(biology)), our lineage "took over the world" in the sense that if humans want a resource that cats or crows or octopuses are using, the nonhuman side of the ensuing conflict is predictably going to lose. (To the extent that we don't usually think of ourselves as engaging in a "conflict". Animals aren't _enemies_; they're just in the way.) This is not because humans are stronger or have sharper teeth than other creatures, but because of something about our "intelligence" in the natural-phenomenon sense, not the IQ test variation sense. It's not even necessarily about _individual_ human intelligence being a particularly formidable force: given no tools and no friends, and confronted by a hungry lion at ten paces, it doesn't seem easy to survive by thinking of some incredibly clever plan. If you had a gun, you could shoot the lion, but [no one individual knows how to make a gun](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I,_Pencil) all by themselves, starting from nothing.
+
+Rather, the power of humanity over the rest of the biosphere has to do with our species having evolved a suite of cognitive capabilities adequate to support the accumulation of culture and technology. If you already had a spear, you might be able to think of of some incredibly clever plan to get a slightly sharper spear—which everyone in your tribe could imitate. And so on up the tech tree.
+
+[TODO: ↓ clunky prose probably needs a rewrite after better outlining]
+
+You can think of events on Earth before the rise of human civilization as mostly being shaped by evolution by natural selection: new complex ordered phenomena arose as the product of genetic mutations that allowed their bearers to survive and reproduce, thereby increasing the frequency of the mutation. Natural selection is a form of _optimization_: the accumulation of beneficial mutations creates functionality that looks "designed" for the purposes of reproduction, because they were selected for existence on that basis.
+
+But _after_ the rise of civilization, biological evolution stopped being the dominant force shaping planetary events, just because cultural evolution runs on a faster timescale. If some other species were on the evolutionary path towards developing the capabilities that would eventually result in them developing their own civilization, it basically "wouldn't matter".
+
+To the extent that our civilization is better for us to live in than the state of nature, it's because civilization is the product of the cumulative optimization of humans trying to acheive their goals: vast, complex infrastructure and economies look "designed" to cater to human needs—supermarkets to feed us, hospitals to heal us, cars and airplanes to take us where we want to go—because we selected them for existence on that basis.