memoir: tap at threats §

Not sure how to weave in the Emerson prosecution anecdote; keep
rolling

diff --git a/content/drafts/standing-under-the-same-sky.md b/content/drafts/standing-under-the-same-sky.md
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--- a/content/drafts/standing-under-the-same-sky.md
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@@ -99,18 +99,16 @@ So, naïvely, doesn't Yudkowsky's "personally prudent to post your agreement wit
 
 I can think of two reasons why the naïve objection might fail. (And who can say but that a neutral expert witness on decision theory wouldn't think of more?)
 
-First, the true decision theory is subtler than "defy anything that you can commonsensically pattern-match as looking like 'extortion'"; the case for resisting extortion specifically rests on there existing a subjunctive dependence between your decision and the extortionist's decision (they threaten _because_ you'll give in, or don't bother _because_ you won't), and the relevant subjunctive dependence doesn't obviously pertain in the real-life science intellectual _vs._ social justice mob match-up. If the mob has been trained from past experience to predict that their targets will give in, should you defy them now in order to somehow make your current situation "less real"? Depending on the correct theory of logical counterfactuals, the correct stance might be ["We don't negotiate with terrorists, but we do appease bears"](/2019/Dec/political-science-epigrams/) (because the bear's response isn't calculated based on our response), and the progressive egregore might be relevantly bear-like.
+First, the true decision theory is subtler than "defy anything that you can commonsensically pattern-match as looking like 'extortion'"; the case for resisting extortion specifically rests on there existing a subjunctive dependence between your decision and the extortionist's decision (they threaten _because_ you'll give in, or won't bother _because_ you won't), and the relevant subjunctive dependence doesn't obviously pertain in the real-life science intellectual _vs._ social justice mob match-up. If the mob has been trained from past experience to predict that their targets will give in, should you defy them now in order to somehow make your current situation "less real"? Depending on the correct theory of logical counterfactuals, the right stance might be ["We don't negotiate with terrorists, but we do appease bears"](/2019/Dec/political-science-epigrams/) (because the bear's response isn't calculated based on our response), and the forces of political orthodoxy might be relevantly bear-like.
 
-On the other hand, the relevant subjunctive dependence doesn't obviously _not_ pertain, either!
+On the other hand, the relevant subjunctive dependence doesn't obviously _not_ pertain, either! Parsing social justice as an agentic "threat" rather than a non-agentic obstacle like an avalanche, does seem to line up with the fact that people punish heretics, who dissent from an ideological group, more than infidels, who were never part of the group to begin with—_because_ heretics are more extortable—more vulnerable to social punishment from the original group.
+
+Which brings me to the second reason the naïve anti-extortion argument might fail: what counts as "extortion" depends on the relevant "property rights", what the "default" action is. If having free speech is the default, being excluded from the coalition for defying the orthodoxy could be construed as extortion. But if _being excluded from the coalition_ is the default, maybe toeing the line of orthodoxy is the price you need to pay in order to be included.
 
 [TODO: defying threats, cont'd—
 
  * Yudkowsky does seemingly back commonsensical interpretations, re voting, or how, back in 'aught-nine, SingInst had made a point of prosecuting Tyler Emerson, citing decision theory
 
- * But the parsing of social justice as an agentic "threat" to be avoided rather than a rock to be dodged does seem to line up with the fact that people punish heretics more than infidels.
-
- * But it matters where you draw the zero point: is being excluded from the coalition a "punishment" to threaten you out of bad behavior, or is being included a "reward" for good behavior?
-
  * Curtis Yarvin has compared Yudkowsky to Sabbatai Zevi (/2020/Aug/yarvin-on-less-wrong/), and I've got to say the comparison is dead-on. Sabbatai Zevi was facing much harsher coercion: his choices were to convert to Islam or be impaled https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabbatai_Zevi#Conversion_to_Islam
 
 ]