Title: The Two-Type Taxonomy Is a Useful Approximation for a More Detailed Causal Model
-Date: 2022-03-30 05:00
+Date: 2022-07-08 18:00
Category: commentary
-Tags: causality, two-type taxonomy
-Status: draft
+Tags: causality, epistemology, two-type taxonomy
A lot of people tend to balk when first hearing about the [two-type taxonomy of male-to-female transsexualism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blanchard's_transsexualism_typology). What, one scoffs, you're saying _all_ trans women are exactly one of these two things? It seems at once both too simple and too specific.
-In some ways, it's a fair complaint! Psychology is _complicated_; every human is their own unique snowflake. But it would be impossible to navigate the world using the "every human is their own unique _maximum-entropy_ snowflake" theory. In order to [compress our observations](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mB95aqTSJLNR9YyjH/message-length) of the world we see, we end up distilling our observations into categories, clusters, diagnoses, [taxons](https://lorienpsych.com/2020/10/30/ontology-of-psychiatric-conditions-taxometrics/): no one matches any particular clinical-profile stereotype _exactly_, but [the world makes more sense when you have language for theoretical abstractions](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/ontology-of-psychiatric-conditions) like ["comas"](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/08/11/does-the-glasgow-coma-scale-exist-do-comas/) or "depression" or "borderline personality disorder"—or "autogynephilia".
+In some ways, it's a fair complaint! Psychology is _complicated_; every human is their own unique snowflake. But it would be impossible to navigate the world using the "every human is their own unique _maximum-entropy_ snowflake" theory. In order to [compress our observations](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/mB95aqTSJLNR9YyjH/message-length) of the world we see, we end up distilling our observations into [categories](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/esRZaPXSHgWzyB2NL/where-to-draw-the-boundaries), clusters, diagnoses, [taxons](https://lorienpsych.com/2020/10/30/ontology-of-psychiatric-conditions-taxometrics/): no one matches any particular clinical-profile stereotype _exactly_, but [the world makes more sense when you have language for theoretical abstractions](https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/ontology-of-psychiatric-conditions) like ["comas"](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/08/11/does-the-glasgow-coma-scale-exist-do-comas/) or "depression" or "borderline personality disorder"—or "autogynephilia".
-Concepts and theories are good to the extent that they can "pay for" their complexity by making more accurate predictions. How much complexity is worth how much accuracy? Arguably, it depends! General relativity has superseded Newtonian classical mechanics as the ultimate theory of how gravity works, but if you're not dealing with velocities approaching the speed of light, Newton still makes _very good_ predictions: it's pretty reasonable to still talk about Newtonian gravitation being "true" if it makes the math easier on you, and the more complicated math doesn't give appreciably different answers to the problems you're interested in.
+Concepts and theories are good to the extent that they can "pay for" their complexity by making more accurate predictions. How much more complexity is worth how much more accuracy? Arguably, it depends! General relativity has superseded Newtonian classical mechanics as the ultimate theory of how gravity works, but if you're not dealing with velocities approaching the speed of light, Newton still makes _very good_ predictions: it's pretty reasonable to still talk about Newtonian gravitation being "true" if it makes the math easier on you, and the more complicated math doesn't give appreciably different answers to the problems you're interested in.
Moreover, if relativity hasn't been invented yet, it makes sense to stick with Newtonian gravity as the _best_ theory you have _so far_, even if there are a few anomalies [like the precession of Mercury](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tests_of_general_relativity#Perihelion_precession_of_Mercury) that it struggles to explain.
The same general principles of reasoning apply to psychological theories, even though psychology is a much more difficult subject matter and our available theories are correspondingly much poorer and vaguer. There's no way to make precise quantitative predictions about a human's behavior the way we can about the movements of the planets, but we still know _some_ things about humans, which get expressed as high-level generalities that nevertheless admit many exceptions: if you don't have the complicated true theory that would account for everything, then simple theories plus noise are better than _pretending not to have a theory_. As you learn more, you can try to pin down a more complicated theory that explains some of the anomalies that looked like "noise" to the simpler theory.
-What does this look like for psychological theories? In the crudest form, when we notice a pattern of traits that go together, we give it a name. Sometimes people go through cycles of elevated arousal and hyperactivity, punctuated by pits of depression. After seeing the same distinctive patterns in many such cases, doctors decided to reify it as a diagnosis, ["bipolar disorder"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bipolar_disorder).
+What does this look like for psychological theories? In the crudest form, when we notice a pattern of traits that tend to go together, we give it a name. Sometimes people go through cycles of elevated arousal and hyperactivity, punctuated by pits of depression. After seeing the same distinctive patterns in many such cases, doctors decided to reify it as a diagnosis, ["bipolar disorder"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bipolar_disorder).
If we notice further patterns _within_ the group of cases that make up a category, we can spit it up into sub-categories: for example, a diagnosis of bipolar I requires a full-blown manic episode, but hypomania and a major depressive episode qualify one for bipolar II.
-Is the two-type typology of bipolar disorder a good theory? Are bipolar I and bipolar II "really" different conditions, or slightly different presentations of "the same" condition, part of a "bipolar spectrum" along with [cyclothymia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclothymia)? In our current state of knowledge, this is debatable, but if our understanding of the etiology of bipolar disorder were to advance, and we were to find evidence that that bipolar I has a different underlying _causal structure_ from bipolar II with decision-relevant consequences (like responding to different treatments), that would support a policy of thinking and talking about them as mostly separate things—even while they have enough in common to both be kinds of "bipolar". The simple high-level category ("bipolar disorder") is a useful approximation in the absence of knowing the sub-category (bipolar I _vs._ II), and the subcategory is a useful approximation in the absence of knowing the patient's detailed case history.
+Is the two-type typology of bipolar disorder a good theory? Are bipolar I and bipolar II "really" different conditions, or slightly different presentations of "the same" condition, part of a "bipolar spectrum" along with [cyclothymia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclothymia)? In our current state of knowledge, this is debatable, but if our understanding of the etiology of bipolar disorder were to advance, and we were to find evidence that that bipolar I has a different underlying _causal structure_ from bipolar II with decision-relevant consequences (like responding to different treatments), that would support a policy of thinking and talking about them as mostly separate things—even while they have enough in common to call them both kinds of "bipolar". The simple high-level category ("bipolar disorder") is a useful approximation in the absence of knowing the sub-category (bipolar I _vs._ II), and the subcategory is a useful approximation in the absence of knowing the patient's detailed case history.
With a _sufficiently_ detailed causal story, you could even dispense with the high-level categories altogether and directly talk about the consequences of different neurotransmitter counts or whatever—but lacking that supreme precise knowledge, it's useful to sum over the details into high-level categories, and meaningful to debate whether a one-type or two-type taxonomy is a better statistical fit to the underlying reality whose full details we don't know.
In the case of male-to-female transsexualism, we notice a pattern where androphilic and non-androphilic trans women seem to be different from each other—not just in their sexuality, but also in their age of dysphoria onset, interests, and personality.
-This claim is most famously associated with the work of [Blanchard](/papers/blanchard-typology_of_mtf_transsexualism.pdf), [Bailey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Man_Who_Would_Be_Queen), and [Lawrence](http://www.annelawrence.com/autogynephilia_&_MtF_typology.html), who argue that there are two discrete types of male-to-female transsexualism: an autogynephilic type (basically, [men who love women and want to become what they love](/papers/lawrence-becoming_what_we_love.pdf)), and an androphilic/homosexual type (basically, the extreme right tail of feminine gay men).
+This claim is most famously associated with the work of [Ray Blanchard](/papers/blanchard-typology_of_mtf_transsexualism.pdf), [J. Michael Bailey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Man_Who_Would_Be_Queen), and [Anne Lawrence](http://www.annelawrence.com/autogynephilia_&_MtF_typology.html), who argue that there are two discrete types of male-to-female transsexualism: an autogynephilic type (basically, [men who love women and want to become what they love](/papers/lawrence-becoming_what_we_love.pdf)), and an androphilic/homosexual type (basically, the extreme right tail of feminine gay men).
But many authors have noticed the same bimodal clustering of traits under various names, [while disagreeing about the underlying causality](/2021/Feb/you-are-right-and-i-was-wrong-reply-to-tailcalled-on-causality/). [Veale, Clarke, and Lomax](/papers/veale-lomax-clarke-identity_defense_model.pdf) attribute the differences to whether defense mechanisms are used to suppress a gender-variant identity. [Anne Vitale](http://www.avitale.com/developmentalreview.htm) identifies distinct groups (Group One and Group Three, in her terminology), but hypothesizes that the difference is due to degree of prenatal androgenization. Julia Serano [concedes that "the correlations that Blanchard and other researchers prior to him described generally hold true"](/papers/serano-agp-a_scientific_review_feminist_analysis_and_alternative.pdf), but denies their causal or taxonometric significance.
-Is a two type typology of male-to-female transsexualism a good theory? Is it "really" two different conditions (following Blanchard _et al._), or slightly different presentations of "the same" condition (following Veale _et al._)?
+Is a two type typology of male-to-female transsexualism a good theory? Is it "really" two different conditions (following Blanchard _et al._), or slightly different presentations of "the same" condition (following _e.g._ Veale _et al._)?
-When the question is posed as such—if I have to choose between a one-type and a two-type theory—then I think the two-type theory is superior. But I also think we can do better and say more about the underlying causal structure that the simple two-types story is approximating, and hopefully explain anomalous cases that look like "noise" to the simple theory.
+When the question is posed that way—if I have to choose between a one-type and a two-type theory—then I think the two-type theory is superior. But I also think we can do better and say more about the underlying causal structure that the simple two-types story is approximating, and hopefully explain anomalous cases that look like "noise" to the simple theory.
In the language of [causal graphs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causal_graph) (where the arrows point from cause to effect), here's what I think is going on:
Third—various cultural factors. You can't be trans if your culture doesn't have a concept of "being trans", and the concepts [and incentives](/2017/Dec/lesser-known-demand-curves/) that your culture offers, make a difference as to how you turn out. Many people who think of themselves as trans women in today's culture, could very well be "the same" as people who thought of themselves as drag queens or occasional cross-dressers 10 or 20 or 30 years ago. (Either "the same" in terms of underlying dispositions, or, in many cases, just literally the same people.)
-If there are multiple non-mutually-exclusive reasons why transitioning might seem like a good idea to someone, then the decision of whether to transition could take the form of a liability–threshold model: males transition if the _sum_ of their levels of femininity, autogynephilia, and culture-related-trans-disposition exceed some threshold (given some sensible scheme for quantifying and adding (!) these traits).
+If there are multiple non-mutually-exclusive reasons why transitioning might seem like a good idea to someone, then the decision of whether to transition could take the form of a [liability–threshold model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threshold_model): males transition if the _sum_ of their levels of femininity, autogynephilia, and culture-related-trans-disposition exceed some threshold (given some sensible scheme for quantifying and adding (!) these traits).
-You might ask: okay, but then where do the two types come from? This graph is just illustrating (conjectured) cause-and-effect relationships, but if we were actually to flesh it out as a complete Bayesian network, there would be additional data that quantitatively specifies what (probability distribution over) values each node takes conditional on the values of its parents. When I claim that Blanchard–Bailey–Lawrence's two-type taxonomy is a useful approximation for this causal model, I'm claiming that the distribution represented by this Bayesian network (if we had the complete network) could also be approximated a two-cluster model: _most_ people high in the "femininity" factor will be low in the "autogynephilia" factor and _vice versa_, such that you can buy decent predictive accuracy by casually speaking as if there were two discrete "types".
+You might ask: okay, but then where do the two types come from? This graph is just illustrating (conjectured) cause-and-effect relationships, but if we were actually to flesh it out as a complete [Bayesian network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_network), there would be additional data that quantitatively specifies what (probability distribution over) values each node takes conditional on the values of its parents. When I claim that Blanchard–Bailey–Lawrence's two-type taxonomy is a useful approximation for this causal model, I'm claiming that the distribution represented by this Bayesian network (if we had the complete network) could also be approximated a two-cluster model: _most_ trans women high in the "femininity" factor will be low in the "autogynephilia" factor and _vice versa_, such that you can buy decent predictive accuracy by casually speaking as if there were two discrete "types".
-Why? It has to do with the parents of femininity and autogynephilia in the graph. Suppose that gay men are more feminine than straight men, and autogynephilia is the result of being straight plus having an "erotic target location error", in which men who are attracted to something (in this case, women), are also attracted to the idea of _being_ that thing.
+Why? It has to do with the parents of femininity and autogynephilia in the graph. Suppose that gay men are more feminine than straight men, and autogynephilia is the result of being straight plus having an ["erotic target location error"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erotic_target_location_error), in which men who are attracted to something (in this case, women), are also attracted to the idea of _being_ that thing.
-Then the value of the sexual-orientation node is pushing the values of its children in _opposite_ directions: gay males are more feminine and less autogynephilic, and straight males are less feminine and more autogynephilic, leading to two broadly different etiological trajectories by which transition might seem like a good idea to someone, even while it's not that the two types have nothing in common. For example, this model predicts that among autogynephilic males, those who transition are going to be selected for higher levels of femininity compared to those who don't transition—and in that aspect, their stories are going to have _something_ in common with their androphilic sisters, even if the latter are broadly _more_ feminine.
+Then the value of the sexual-orientation node is pushing the values of its children in _opposite_ directions: gay males are more feminine and less autogynephilic, and straight males are less feminine and more autogynephilic, leading to two broadly different etiological trajectories by which transition might seem like a good idea to someone—even while it's not the case that the two types have _nothing_ in common. For example, this model predicts that among autogynephilic males, those who transition are going to be selected for higher levels of femininity compared to those who don't transition—and in that aspect, their stories are going to have _something_ in common with their androphilic sisters, even if the latter are broadly _more_ feminine.
-(Of course, it's also the case that the component factors in a liability-threshold model would negatively correlate among the population past a threshold, due to the effect of conditioning on a collider, as in the famous Berkson's paradox. But I'm claiming that the degree of bimodality induced by the effects of sexual orientation is substantially greater than that accounted for by the conditioning-on-a-collider effect.)
+(Of course, it's also the case that the component factors in a liability-threshold model would negatively correlate among the population past a threshold, due to the effect of conditioning on a [collider](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collider_(statistics)), as in the famous [Berkson's paradox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkson%27s_paradox). But I'm claiming that the degree of bimodality induced by the effects of sexual orientation is substantially greater than that accounted for by the conditioning-on-a-collider effect.)
-An advantage of this kind of _probabilistic_ model is that it gives us a _causal_ account of the broad trends we see, while also not being too "brittle" in the face of a complex world. The threshold graphical model explains why the two-type taxonomy looks so compelling as a first approximation, without immediately collapsing the moment we meet a relatively unusual individual who doesn't seem to quite fit the strictest interpretation of the classical two-type taxonomy. For example, when we meet a trans woman who's not very feminine _and_ has no history of autogynephilia, we can predict that in her case, there were probably unusually intense cultural factors (_e.g._, internalized misandry) making transition seem like a salient option (and therefore that her analogue in previous generations wouldn't have been transsexual), instead of predicting that she doesn't exist. (It's possible that what Blanchard–Bailey–Lawrence conceived of as a androphilic _vs._ autogynephilic taxonomy, may be better thought of as an androphilic _vs._ not-otherwise-specified taxonomy, if it's not easy to disambiguate autogynephilia from all other possible reasons for not-overtly-feminine males to show up at the gender clinic.)
+An advantage of this kind of _probabilistic_ model is that it gives us a _causal_ account of the broad trends we see, while also not being too "brittle" in the face of a complex world. The threshold graphical model explains why the two-type taxonomy looks so compelling as a first approximation, without immediately collapsing the moment we meet a relatively unusual individual who doesn't seem to quite fit the strictest interpretation of the classical two-type taxonomy. For example, when we meet a trans woman who's not very feminine _and_ has no history of autogynephilia, we can predict that in her case, there were probably unusually intense cultural factors (_e.g._, internalized misandry) making transition seem like a salient option (and therefore that her analogue in previous generations wouldn't have been transsexual), instead of predicting that she doesn't exist. (It's possible that what Blanchard–Bailey–Lawrence conceived of as a androphilic _vs._ autogynephilic taxonomy, may be better thought of as an androphilic _vs._ not-otherwise-specified taxonomy, if feminine androphiles form a distinct cluster, but it's not easy to disambiguate autogynephilia from all other possible reasons for not-overtly-feminine males to show up at the gender clinic.)
Care must be taken to avoid abusing the probabilistic nature of the model to make excuses to avoid falsification. The theory that can explain everything _with equal probability_, explains nothing: if you find yourself saying, "Oh, this case is an exception" too _often_, you do need to revise your theory. But a "small" number of "exceptions" can actually be fine: a theory that says a coin is biased to come up Heads 80% of the time, isn't falsified by a single Tails (and is in fact _confirmed_ if that Tails happens 20% of the time).
Ultimately, the reader cannot abdicate responsibility to think it through and decide for herself ... but it seems to _me_ that all six arrows in the graph are things that we separately have a pretty large weight of evidence for, either in published scientific studies, or just informally looking at the world.
-The femininity→transition arrow is obvious. The sexual orientation→femininity arrow (representing the fact that gay men are more feminine than straight men), besides being stereotypical folk knowledge, has also been extensively documented, for example by [Lippa](/papers/lippa-gender-related_traits_in_gays.pdf) and by [Bailey and Zucker](/papers/bailey-zucker-childhood_sex-typed_behavior_and_sexual_orientation.pdf). The v-structure between sexual orientation, erotic target location erroneousness, and autogynephilia has been [documented by Anne Lawrence](/papers/lawrence-etle_an_underappreciated.pdf): furries and amputee-wannabes who want to emulate the objects of their attraction, "look like" "the same thing" as autogynephiles, but pointed at a less conventional erotic than women. The autogynephilia–transition concordance has been documented by many authors, and I claim the direction of causality is obvious. (If you want to argue that it goes the other way—that some underlying "gender identity" causes both autogynephilia and, separately, the desire to transition, then why does it usually not work that way for androphiles?) The cultural-factors→transition arrow is obvious if you haven't been living under a rock for the last decade.
+The femininity→transition arrow is obvious. The sexual orientation→femininity arrow (representing the fact that gay men are more feminine than straight men), besides being stereotypical folk knowledge, has also been extensively documented, for example by [Lippa](/papers/lippa-gender-related_traits_in_gays.pdf) and by [Bailey and Zucker](/papers/bailey-zucker-childhood_sex-typed_behavior_and_sexual_orientation.pdf). Evidence for the "v-structure" between sexual orientation, erotic target location erroneousness, and autogynephilia has been [documented by Anne Lawrence](/papers/lawrence-etle_an_underappreciated.pdf): furries and amputee-wannabes who want to emulate the objects of their attraction, "look like" "the same thing" as autogynephiles, but pointed at a less conventional erotic target than women. The autogynephilia–transition concordance has been [documented](https://sillyolme.wordpress.com/2016/02/02/four-out-of-five/) [by](https://old.reddit.com/r/MtF/search?q=fetish&restrict_sr=on) [many](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4614-5182-2) [authors](http://juliaserano.blogspot.com/2015/05/reconceptualizing-autogynephilia-as_26.html), and I claim the direction of causality is obvious. (If you want to argue that it goes the other way—that some underlying "gender identity" causes both autogynephilia and, separately, the desire to transition, then why does it usually not work that way for androphiles?) The cultural-factors→transition arrow is obvious if you haven't been living under a rock for the last decade.
-This has been a qualitative summary of my current thinking. I'm very bullish on thinking in graphical models rather than discrete taxons being the way to go, but it would be a lot more work to try to pin down all these claims rigorously—or, to the extent that my graph is wrong, to figure out the correct (or, _a_ more correct, less wrong) graph instead.
+This has been a qualitative summary of my current thinking. I'm very bullish on thinking in graphical models rather than discrete taxons being the way to go, but it would be a lot more work to pin down all these claims more rigorously—or, to the extent that my graph is wrong, to figure out the correct (or, _a_ more correct, less wrong) graph instead.
_(Thanks to the immortal [Tailcalled](https://surveyanon.wordpress.com/) for discussion.)_
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