From: Zack M. Davis Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2026 03:34:03 +0000 (-0700) Subject: "Contra Piper" wording tweaks X-Git-Url: http://unremediatedgender.space/source?a=commitdiff_plain;h=2ad5e52f98366016b7d2a8eb6675478f1a495c13;p=An_Algorithmic_Lucidity.git "Contra Piper" wording tweaks --- diff --git a/content/2026/contra-piper-on-when-conversation-is-possible.md b/content/2026/contra-piper-on-when-conversation-is-possible.md index e6aa498..0181aa6 100644 --- a/content/2026/contra-piper-on-when-conversation-is-possible.md +++ b/content/2026/contra-piper-on-when-conversation-is-possible.md @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ It certainly doesn't make conversation with _me_ impossible. When someone tells ## Why It's Possible to Communicate with People Who Think You're Self-Deceived -One reason why someone might think it's different is for fear that accusations of self-deception are unfalsifiable. I have privileged introspective access to my beliefs and motivations. On what possible basis could someone else tell me I'm wrong? And what reasoning and evidence could I possibly offer to defend the accuracy of my self-perception? If the accusation or its denial can be made just as well independently of any third-party-accessible evidence, then that inherently does make conversation nearly impossible. What would there be to talk about? +One reason why someone might think it's different is for fear that accusations of self-deception are unfalsifiable. I have privileged introspective access to my beliefs and motivations. On what possible basis could someone else tell me I'm wrong? And what evidence could I possibly offer to defend the accuracy of my self-perception? If the accusation or its denial can be made just as well independently of any third-party-accessible evidence, then that inherently does make conversation nearly impossible. What would there be to talk about? However, I reject the premise that the accusation or its denial can be made just as well independently of any third-party-accessible evidence. I may have privileged introspective access to my beliefs and motivations, but beliefs and motivations aren't epiphenomenal, either. We form beliefs about other entities' beliefs and motivations because such beliefs [let us predict their behavior](https://www.readthesequences.com/Making-Beliefs-Pay-Rent-In-Anticipated-Experiences). An animal that goes to the stream to drink is presumed to be motivated by thirst; the same animal going to the stream despite it having dried up in the summer heat is presumed to have (falsely) believed that the water would still be there. We don't need to know what it feels like to be the animal in order to speak sensibly of such mental states. @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ If I buy cookies for the [salon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salon_(gathering) At the same time, my belief that I wasn't swayed by favoritism is something I can provide reasoning and evidence for: for example, I could try showing the other salon members the notes and spreadsheets I compiled while comparison shopping, which justify my belief that my girlfriend just happens to be the optimal dessert vendor for the salon according to the obvious objective criteria—price, quality, [Anzac biscuit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anzac_biscuit) availability, and owner's prior familiarity with the salon's reading list. -I might not convince them, but at least we have _something to talk about_: it's not a deadlock between an unfalsifiable accusation of self-deception and an unfalsifiable denial, because my catering decision (and therefore the beliefs and motives that led to it) was tangled up with empirical realities of the world. If my comparison shopping was thorough and credibly documents the many ways in which my girlfriend's bakery is just the best, that makes my story about only wanting the best cookies for the salon more credible; if I didn't really shop around much, that makes my story less credible. The correctness of my understanding of my beliefs and motives is something I can rationally defend to skeptics in front of third parties; it's not something that needs to be assumed as a prerequisite for even talking at all. +I might not convince them, but at least we have _something to talk about_: it's not a deadlock between an unfalsifiable accusation of self-deception and an unfalsifiable denial, because my catering decision (and therefore the beliefs and motives that led to it) was tangled up with empirical realities of the world. For example, if my comparison shopping was thorough and credibly documents the many ways in which my girlfriend's bakery is just the best, that makes my story about only wanting the best cookies for the salon more credible; if I didn't really shop around much, that makes my story less credible. The correctness of my understanding of my beliefs and motives is something I can defend to skeptics in front of third parties (successfully or otherwise); it's not something that needs to be assumed as a prerequisite for even talking at all. ## Why the Self-Understanding of Those Who Think It's Impossible Should Be Rejected