From: Zack M. Davis Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2025 23:57:43 +0000 (-0700) Subject: drafting "Comment on Yudkowsky on Asymmetric Trans Panic" X-Git-Url: http://unremediatedgender.space/source?a=commitdiff_plain;h=74a422cad808c3143fca1134df170871226bb0a9;p=Ultimately_Untrue_Thought.git drafting "Comment on Yudkowsky on Asymmetric Trans Panic" --- diff --git a/content/drafts/comment-on-yudkowsky-on-asymmetric-trans-panic.md b/content/drafts/comment-on-yudkowsky-on-asymmetric-trans-panic.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cfe2f36 --- /dev/null +++ b/content/drafts/comment-on-yudkowsky-on-asymmetric-trans-panic.md @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +Title: Comment on Yudkowsky on Asymmetric Trans Panic +Date: 2025-09-15 11:00 +Category: commentary +Tags: Eliezer Yudkowsky +Status: draft + +On Twitter, [Eliezer Yudkowsky wonders](https://lightbrd.com/ESYudkowsky/status/1961782023573709003) why male-to-female transsexualism triggers more reactionary public opprobrium than female-to-male. + +Yudkowsky proposes four potential explanatory factors, not mutually exclusive: (1) that modern liberal Society doesn't care about gatekeeping male roles the way its forbearers did, (2) that MtF triggers intuitions in men for the repression of specifically male homosexuality, (3) that FtM transitions are more effective on the merits of passability with extant technology, and (4) that MtF threatens sex-segregation conventions whose purpose is to protect females from males (as of, _e.g._, bathrooms and chess tournaments). + +I agree that to the extent that MtF faces more opposition than FtM, all four explanatory factors seem broadly plausible. I probably disagree with Yudkowsky on the relative importance of the four factors, but that disagreement is sufficiently minor and uninteresting that the details are probably better relegated to a footnote. + + +[TODO: footnote acknowledge that later in the thread acknowledges that the observation is not entirely true; especially re: youth and detransition] +[TODO: footnote discussing factor disagreement; footnote 7 of /2018/Feb/the-categories-were-made-for-man-to-make-predictions anticipates (3) and (4) +All four theories have some plausibility, but the historical FtM panic claim is questionable +https://claude.ai/chat/ec48fc50-3346-4b48-8f85-103f9b522119 +https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charley_Parkhurst +and I put much more weight than Yudkowsky on #4 (downstream of me doubting his history) +] + +The occasion of the present post is that Yudkowsky goes on to say: + +> One thing that all of these theories have in common: They do not appeal to the generic hardness of ontological categories producing alarm about generic boundary violations. They do not appeal to a deep generic horror of things being described as other than what they are. +> +> I could only dream of a world where human beings always, inherently, consistently cared that much about exact descriptive accuracy. They would insist on FDA labels actually describing things. +> +> An older era's indignation about a black trying to pass as white, a newer era's indignation about a white trying to pass as black, is tied to each era's notion of what specifically is being stolen—not to generic ontological finickiness. Hence the outrage being asymmetrical. +> +> A theory #0 that people are outraged by things being classified into the wrong intrinsic category—as opposed to people reaching for that afterward as a rationalization—does not predict in advance any asymmetry of indignation about MtF versus FtM. +> +> *mike drop* + +With the important exception of the "as opposed to people reaching for that afterward as a rationalization" clause (as I'll explain momentarily), I agree with each of the sentences here, but I find it puzzling that Yudkowsky thinks this is a ["mic drop"](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mic%20drop) moment. Who exactly is being criticized here? _Is_ there anyone who thinks that anti-trans public sentiment is solely explained by a deep generic horror of things being described as other than what they are? To establish that he's not beating up on a strawman, Yudkowsky [would do better](https://x.com/TheDavidSJ/status/1858097225743663267) to quote some specific representative author actually making the claim that he's refuting. + +As someone who [_has_ expressed a deep generic horror of things being described as other than what they are and criticized gender identity ideology on those specific grounds](/2024/Mar/agreeing-with-stalin-in-ways-that-exhibit-generally-rationalist-principles/#it-matters-whether-peoples-beliefs-about-themselves-are-actually-true), perhaps I should clarify why I don't think Yudkowsky's rationalization accusation holds weight. + +The answer is simple: different people have different beliefs and motivations, even if they end up expressing roughly or superficially similar opinions on some particular issue; and also, the same person can harbor multiple motivations which all contribute to their opinion on some particular issue. + +When gender-critical feminists like [Meghan Murphy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meghan_Murphy#Opposition_to_transgender_activism) or [Kellie-Jay Keen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kellie-Jay_Keen-Minshull#Biography_and_views) decry the destruction of women's single-sex spaces, they're standing up for what they see as women's interests, as feminists do. (This is Yudkowsky's theory #4.) + +When conservatives like [Michael Knowles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Knowles_(political_commentator)) decry transgenderism as continuous with a broader leftist project to alienate humanity from our embodied nature as ordained by God, they're opposing radical social change, as conservatives do. + +When philosophers like the present writer or [Alex Byrne](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex_Byrne_(philosopher)#Writing) criticize gender identity theories as describing things as other than what they are, they're expressing a devotion to the truth, as philosophers do. (Given his [earlier work on human rationality](https://www.readthesequences.com/), one might have expected Yudkowsky to sympathize with this motivation, but I guess [those days are over](/2024/Mar/agreeing-with-stalin-in-ways-that-exhibit-generally-rationalist-principles/#the-battle-that-matters).) + +These things can all be true of these different people at the same time! The same person can belong to multiple groups. ([Kathleen Stock](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kathleen_Stock#Views_on_gender_self-identification), for example, is both a philosopher and a gender-critical feminist.) The same person can belong to one group but not others. (I am not a fan of Michael Knowles, and it seems safe to say that Meghan Murphy isn't, either.) There's no contradiction here to explain. + +Yudkowsky acknowledges that his theories #1–4 aren't mutually exclusive. (Theory #2, for example, only tries to explain anti-MtF sentiment in men.) But _the same is true of theory #0_. Yudkowsky is correct to point out that theory #0 can't be the whole story of public anti-trans sentiment, because that would imply equal amounts of anti-MtF and anti-FtM sentiment, which isn't what we observe. + +But no one _said_ theory #0 was the whole story! Theory #0 _wouldn't_ be the whole story even if the people described by theory #0 were objectively correct in their views, because it's possible for humans to arrive at correct beliefs for bad reasons. (The correctness of the theory of evolution isn't the whole story for why people believe it. Some people express pro-evolution sentiments to express resentment for their repressive religious upbringing. But evolution still actually happened.) It's not clear why Yudkowsky would imply that someone thought theory #0 explained all public anti-trans sentiment (without pointing to any examples!), unless his goal were to deny the gender-political relevance of the of the philosophy of language—to tar anyone expressing alarm about inaccurate descriptions as rationalizing bigotries held for less high-minded reasons. + +But the philosophy of language _is_ clearly relevant to what humans are doing when they argue about gender politics. [The cognitive function of categorization is to group decision-relevantly similar things into the same category in order to make similar decisions about them.](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/esRZaPXSHgWzyB2NL/where-to-draw-the-boundaries) As a matter of AI theory, that's what human brains are doing when we use words, whether or not anyone knows it. (In the time of Aristotle, people _didn't_ know it.) + +In deriding the "generic hardness of ontological categories producing alarm about generic boundary violations" as something that "people reach[ ] for [...] afterward as a rationalization", Yudkowsky seems to portray philosophical arguments about accuracy of representations as somehow opposed to culture-specific sensitivities to specific misrepresentations, as if objecting to some lies more than others implies that it's hypocritical to want a philosophical account of lying. + +But a generic theory of deception is compatible with a policy that doesn't punish all deceptions equally! It's pretty common for punishments of deception to depend on who was misled about what. If you try to sell [pyrite ("fool's gold")](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrite) as gold, people who notice will get angry at the attempted fraud. If you try to sell gold as fool's gold, people will be confused but not angry. + +Nevertheless, pyrite is not gold. + + + +[TODO— + +It's normal for the punishment of a lie to depend on consequences (rather than punishing all lies equally out of love of Truth); "afterwards as a rationalization" is a weird frame + +I agree that asymmetry implies that it can't be a pure epistemology issue, because the epistemology problem treats FtM and MtF symmetrically. + +Sure, insofar as sex-segregated public accomodations are to protect females from males, then MtF threatens that in a way that FtM doesn't + +#0 is still a good reason, even if it's not driving the asymmetrical public outrage + +"Generic hardness" isn't actually the real argument; the "blood is thicker than water" argument is empirical + +People care about consequential lies rather than lying-in-general, but lies are still lies!! + +Aella on lying + +> Therefore, I care tons about MtFs in women's bathrooms or chess matches, and nevery say anything about FtMs one way or another + +]