From: M. Taylor Saotome-Westlake Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 07:03:53 +0000 (-0700) Subject: Human Diversity: my excuse X-Git-Url: http://unremediatedgender.space/source?a=commitdiff_plain;h=c82102587b1ccfa8dea45eeb580377a35ced9812;p=Ultimately_Untrue_Thought.git Human Diversity: my excuse --- diff --git a/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md b/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md index 23285f6..5be3299 100644 --- a/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md +++ b/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ Murray opens the parts of the book about sex and race with acknowledgements of t But this kind of defensive half-measure satisfies no one. From the oblivious-science-nerd perspective—the view that agrees with Murray that "everyone should calm down"—you shouldn't _need_ to genuflect to the memory of some historical injustice before you're allowed to talk about Science. But from the perspective that cares about Justice and not just Truth, an _insincere_ gesture or a strategic concession is all the more dangerous insofar as it could function as camoflage for a nefarious hidden agenda. If your work is explicitly aimed at _destroying the anti-oppression Schelling-point belief_, a few hand-wringing historical interludes and bromides about human equality having no testable implications (!!) aren't going to clear you of the suspicion that you're _doing it on purpose_—trying to destroy the anti-oppression Schelling point in order to oppress, not because anything that can be destroyed by the truth, should be. -And sufficient suspicion makes communication nearly impossible. (If you _know_ someone is lying, their words mean nothing, [not even as the opposite of the truth](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qNZM3EGoE5ZeMdCRt/reversed-stupidity-is-not-intelligence).) As far as many of Murray's detractors are concerned, it almost doesn't matter what the text of _Human Diversity_ says, how meticulously researched of a psychology/neuroscience/genetics lit review it is. From their perspective, Murray is "hiding the ball": they're not mad about _this_ book; they're mad about specifically chapters 13 and 14 of a book Murray coauthored twenty-five years ago. (I don't think I'm claiming to be a mind-reader here; the first 20% of [the _New York Times_'s review of _Human Diversity_](https://archive.is/b4xKB) is pretty explicit.) +And sufficient suspicion makes communication nearly impossible. (If you _know_ someone is lying, their words mean nothing, [not even as the opposite of the truth](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/qNZM3EGoE5ZeMdCRt/reversed-stupidity-is-not-intelligence).) As far as many of Murray's detractors are concerned, it almost doesn't matter what the text of _Human Diversity_ says, how meticulously researched of a psychology/neuroscience/genetics lit review it is. From their perspective, Murray is "hiding the ball": they're not mad about _this_ book; they're mad about specifically chapters 13 and 14 of a book Murray coauthored twenty-five years ago. (I don't think I'm claiming to be a mind-reader here; the first 20% of [the _New York Times_'s review of _Human Diversity_](https://archive.is/b4xKB) is pretty explicit and representative.) In 1994's _The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life_, Murray and coauthor Richard J. Herrnstein argued that a lot of variation in life outcomes is explained by variation in intelligence. Some people think that folk concepts of "intelligence" or being "smart" are ill-defined and therefore not a proper object of scientific study. But that hasn't stopped some psychologists from trying to construct tests purporting to measure an "intelligence quotient" (or _IQ_ for short). It turns out that if you give people a bunch of different mental tests, the results all positively correlate with each other: people who are good at one mental task, like listening to a list of numbers and repeating them backwards ("reverse digit span"), are also good at others, like knowing what words mean ("vocabulary"). There's a lot of fancy linear algebra involved, but basically, you can visualize people's test results as a hyperellipsoid in some high-dimensional space where the dimensions are the different tests. (I rely on this ["configuration space"](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/WBw8dDkAWohFjWQSk/the-cluster-structure-of-thingspace) visual metaphor _so much_ for _so many_ things that when I started [my secret ("secret") gender blog](/), it felt right to put it under a dot-space [TLD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Top-level_domain).) The longest axis of the hyperellipsoid corresponds to the "_g_ factor" of "general" intelligence—the choice of axis that cuts through the most variance in mental abilities. @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ This _should_ just be more social-science nerd stuff, the sort of thing that wou It's important not to overinterpret the IQ-scores-by-race results; there are a bunch of standard caveats that go here that everyone's treatment of the topic needs to include. Again, just because variance in a trait is statistically associated with variance in genes _within_ a population, does _not_ mean that differences in that trait _between_ populations are _caused_ by genes: [remember the illustrations about](#heritability-caveats) sun-deprived plants and internet-deprived red-haired children. Group differences in observed tested IQs are entirely compatible with a world in which those differences are entirely due to the environment imposed by an overtly or structurally racist society. Maybe the tests are culturally biased. Maybe people with higher socioeconomic status get more opportunities to develop their intellect, and racism impedes socio-economic mobility. And so on. -The problem is, a lot of the blank-slatey environmentally-caused-differences-only hypotheses for group IQ differences become less compelling when you look into the details. "Maybe the tests are biased", for example, isn't an insurmountable defeater to the entire endeavor of IQ testing—it is _itself_ a falsifiable hypothesis, or can become one if you specify what you mean by "bias" in detail. One idea of what it would mean for a test to be _biased_ is if it's partially measuring something other than what it purports to be measuring: if your test measures a _combination_ of "intelligence" and "submission to the hegemonic cultural dictates of the test-maker", then individuals and groups that submit less to your cultural hegemony are going to score worse, and if you _market_ your test as unbiasedly measuring intelligence, then people who believe your marketing copy will be misled into thinking that those who don't submit are dumber than they really are. But if so, and if not all of your individual test questions are _equally_ loaded on intelligence and cultural-hegemony, then the cultural bias should _show up in the statistics_. If some questions are more "fair" and others are relatively more culture-biased, then you would expect the _order of item difficulties_ to differ by culture: the ["item characteristic curve"](/papers/baker-kim-the_item_characteristic_curve.pdf) plotting the probability of getting the biased question "right" as a function of _overall_ test score should differ by culture, with the hegemonic group finding it "easier" and others (answering honestly) finding it "harder". Conversely, if the questions that descriminate most between differently-scoring cultural/ethnic/"racial" groups were the same as the questions that discriminate between younger and older children _within_ each group, that would be the kind of statistical clue you would expect to see if the test was unbiased and the group difference was real. Hypotheses that accept IQ test results as unbiased, but attribute group differences to the environment, also make statistical predictions. Controlling for parental socioeconomic status only cuts the black–white gap by a third. +The problem is, a lot of the blank-slatey environmentally-caused-differences-only hypotheses for group IQ differences become less compelling when you look into the details. "Maybe the tests are biased", for example, isn't an insurmountable defeater to the entire endeavor of IQ testing—it is _itself_ a falsifiable hypothesis, or can become one if you specify what you mean by "bias" in detail. One idea of what it would mean for a test to be _biased_ is if it's partially measuring something other than what it purports to be measuring: if your test measures a _combination_ of "intelligence" and "submission to the hegemonic cultural dictates of the test-maker", then individuals and groups that submit less to your cultural hegemony are going to score worse, and if you _market_ your test as unbiasedly measuring intelligence, then people who believe your marketing copy will be misled into thinking that those who don't submit are dumber than they really are. But if so, and if not all of your individual test questions are _equally_ loaded on intelligence and cultural-hegemony, then the cultural bias should _show up in the statistics_. If some questions are more "fair" and others are relatively more culture-biased, then you would expect the _order of item difficulties_ to differ by culture: the ["item characteristic curve"](/papers/baker-kim-the_item_characteristic_curve.pdf) plotting the probability of getting the biased question "right" as a function of _overall_ test score should differ by culture, with the hegemonic group finding it "easier" and others (answering honestly) finding it "harder". Conversely, if the questions that discriminate most between differently-scoring cultural/ethnic/"racial" groups were the same as the questions that discriminate between (say) younger and older children _within_ each group, that would be the kind of statistical clue you would expect to see if the test was unbiased and the group difference was real. Hypotheses that accept IQ test results as unbiased, but attribute group differences to the environment, also make statistical predictions. Controlling for parental socioeconomic status only cuts the black–white gap by a third. [TODO: sentence about sources of variation within/between groups based on Jensen] @@ -136,4 +136,10 @@ The problem is, a lot of the blank-slatey environmentally-caused-differences-onl And so on. -In mentioning these arguments in passing, I'm definitely _not_ trying to provide a comprehensive lit review on the question. (That's [someone else's blog](https://humanvarieties.org/2019/12/22/the-persistence-of-cognitive-inequality-reflections-on-arthur-jensens-not-unreasonable-hypothesis-after-fifty-years/).) +In mentioning these arguments in passing, I'm _not_ trying to provide a comprehensive lit review on the causality of group IQ differences. (That's [someone else's blog](https://humanvarieties.org/2019/12/22/the-persistence-of-cognitive-inequality-reflections-on-arthur-jensens-not-unreasonable-hypothesis-after-fifty-years/).) I'm not (that) interested in this particular topic. I am ... doing some context-setting for the problem I am interested in, of fixing public discourse. The reason we can't have an intellectually-honest public discussion about human biodiversity is because good people want to respect the anti-oppression Schelling point and are afraid of giving ammunition to racists and sexists in the war over the shared map. "Black people are genetically less intelligent than white people, on average" is the kind of sentence that pretty much only racists would feel _good_ about saying out loud, independently of its actual truth value. In a world where most speech is about manipulating shared maps for political advantage rather than _getting the right answer for the right reasons_, it is _rational_ to infer that anyone who entertains such hypotheses is either motivated by racial malice, or is at least complicit with it—and that rational expectation isn't easily cancelled with a _pro forma_ "But free inquiry" or "But the true meaning of equality is unfalsifiable" disclaimer. + +To speak to those who aren't _already_ oblivious science nerds—or are committed to emulating such, as it is scientifically dubious whether anyone is really that oblivious—you need to put _more effort_ into your excuse for why you're interested in these topics. Here's mine, and it's from the heart, though it's up to the reader to judge for herself how credible I am when I say this— + +I don't want to be complicit with hatred or oppression. I want to stay loyal to the underlying egalitarian–individualist axiology that makes the blank slate doctrine _sound like a good idea_. But I also want to understand reality, to make sense of things. I want a world that's not lying to me. Having to believe false things—or even just not being able _say_ certain true things when they would otherwise be relevant—extracts a _dire_ cost on our ability to make sense of the world, because you can't just censor a few forbidden hypotheses—[you have to censor everything that _implies_ them](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wyyfFfaRar2jEdeQK/entangled-truths-contagious-lies), and everything that implies _them_: the more adept you are at making logical connections, [the more of your mind you need to excise to stay in compliance](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XTWkjCJScy2GFAgDt/dark-side-epistemology). + +We can't talk about group differences, for fear that belief in differences will be abused to shore up oppression. But ... structural oppression and actual group differences can _both exist at the same time_. They're not contradicting each other! The fact that men are physically stronger than women is _not unrelated_ to the persistence of patriarchy! That doesn't mean patriarchy is good! [(You can't derive an _ought_ from an _is_.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#io) This is pretty obvious, really? diff --git a/notes/human-diversity-notes.md b/notes/human-diversity-notes.md index 4ea6837..7873200 100644 --- a/notes/human-diversity-notes.md +++ b/notes/human-diversity-notes.md @@ -1,16 +1,18 @@ * structural oppression and actual differences can both exist at the same time! They're not contradicting each other! * I don't know how to build a better world, but my first step is to go a little meta and talk about why we can't talk, and take seriously the possible harms from talking, rather than just asserting that free speech and civil discourse is Actually Good the way the likes of Cofnas/Winegard/Murray do (being a nobody blogger probably helps; I have an excuse) + * women and courage * A few things are actually _worse_ than the ball-hiders make it seem ("treat ppl as individuals" doesn't work; "IQ isn't morally valuable" doesn't work) * Embryo selection looks _really important_; I don't want to give amunition to racists, but I need to talk about that—and the recent Dawkins brouhaha says we can't even talk about that; and the ways I'm worried about eugenics being misused aren't even on the radar * Murray says polygenic scores are like GDP ... I bet Ben and Michael would have something to say about that analogy! * "genders have been identified" - +* Hyde/Fine binary notes: p. 388 * need to talk about individual differences being non-threatening + —and the people who claim not to have an agenda are lying. (The most I can credibly claim for myself is that I try to keep my agenda reasonably _minimalist_—and the reader must judge for herself to what extent I succeed.) I think this is sympathetic but [ultimately ineffective](http://zackmdavis.net/blog/2016/08/ineffective-deconversion-pitch/). Clueless [presentist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presentism_(literary_and_historical_analysis)) conservatism of the form, "Old-timey patriarchy and white supremacy were Really Bad, but that's over and everything is Fine Now" is unlikely to satisfy readers who _don't_ think everything is Fine Now, and suspect Murray of standing athwart history yelling "Stop!" rather than aspiring to Actual Social Science. @@ -30,14 +32,13 @@ When you "treat individuals as individuals", you do so on the basis of evidence is dedicated to casting aspersions on _The Bell Curve_. - effect size: standardized units may be practically useless (if of 1 yr of education reliably led to $1 of income) ["Being Steven Pinker is a lot more fun than being Charles Murray"](https://archive.is/bNo2q)—and Pinker knows it. Similarly, being Charles Murray is a lot more fun than being J. Philippe Rushton—and Murray knows it. -Hyde/Fine binary notes: p. 388 + http://zackmdavis.net/blog/2019/05/the-typical-set/ @@ -96,7 +97,6 @@ afraid of seeming too flippant to readers who haven't decoverted yet; my own dec https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Chesterton%27s_fence https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wyyfFfaRar2jEdeQK/entangled-truths-contagious-lies -https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XTWkjCJScy2GFAgDt/dark-side-epistemology https://arbital.greaterwrong.com/p/rescue_utility https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Aud7CL7uhz55KL8jG/transhumanism-as-simplified-humanism https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/faHbrHuPziFH7Ef7p/why-are-individual-iq-differences-ok