From 65809fb71c387764e6875101ce3ec992b1494722 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "M. Taylor Saotome-Westlake" Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2020 21:02:03 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] check in --- content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md | 8 ++++---- notes/human-diversity-notes.md | 1 + notes/notes.txt | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ notes/post_ideas.txt | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md b/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md index 871738a..eb43d1e 100644 --- a/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md +++ b/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ Title: Book Review: Charles Murray's Human Diversity: The Biology of Gender, Race, and Class Date: 2020-01-01 Category: commentary -Tags: review (book), race, sex differences, Emacs, topology +Tags: Charles Murray, review (book), race, sex differences, Emacs, topology Status: draft [This is a pretty good book](https://www.twelvebooks.com/titles/charles-murray/human-diversity/9781538744000/) about things we know about some ways in which people are different from each other! In [my last book review](/2020/Jan/book-review-the-origins-of-unfairness/), I mentioned that I had been thinking about broadening the topic scope of this blog, and this book review seems like an okay place to start! @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Murray's penultimate chapter summarizes the state of a debate between a "Robert The starry-eyed view epitomized by Plomin says that polygenic scores are _super great_ and everyone _and her dog_ should be excited about them: they're causal in only one direction (the trait can't cause the score) and they let us assess risks in individuals before they happen. Clinical psychology will enter a new era of "positive genomics", where we understand how to work with the underlying dimensions along which people vary (including positively), rather than focusing on treated "diagnoses" that people allegedly "have". -The curmudgeonly view epitomized by Turkheimer says that Science is about understanding the _causal structure_ of phenomena, and that polygenic scores don't fucking tell us anything. [Marital status is heritable _in the same way_ that intelligence is heritable](http://www.geneticshumanagency.org/gha/the-ubiquity-problem-for-group-differences-in-behavior/), not because there are "divorce genes" in any meaningful biological sense, but because of a "universal, nonspecific genetic pull on everything": _all other things being equal_, people with more similar genes will make more similar proteins from those similar genes, and therefore end up with more similar phenotypes that interact with the environment in a more similar way, and _eventually_ (the causality flowing "upwards" through many hierarchical levels of organization) this shows up in the divorce statistics of a particular Society in a particular place and time. But this is completely opaque; the real work of Science is in figuring out what all the particular gene variations actually _do_. +The curmudgeonly view epitomized by Turkheimer says that Science is about understanding the _causal structure_ of phenomena, and that polygenic scores don't fucking tell us anything. [Marital status is heritable _in the same way_ that intelligence is heritable](http://www.geneticshumanagency.org/gha/the-ubiquity-problem-for-group-differences-in-behavior/), not because there are "divorce genes" in any meaningful biological sense, but because of a "universal, nonspecific genetic pull on everything": on average, people with more similar genes will make more similar proteins from those similar genes, and therefore end up with more similar phenotypes that interact with the environment in a more similar way, and _eventually_ (the causality flowing "upwards" through many hierarchical levels of organization) this shows up in the divorce statistics of a particular Society in a particular place and time. But this is completely opaque; the real work of Science is in figuring out what all the particular gene variations actually _do_. Notably, Plomin and Turkheimer aren't actually disagreeing here: it's a difference in emphasis rather than facts. Polygenic scores _don't_ explain mechanisms—but might they end up being useful, and used, anyway? Murray's vision of social science is content to make predictions and "explain variance" while remaining ignorant of ultimate causality. Meanwhile, my cursory understanding (while kicking myself for [_still_](/2018/Dec/untitled-metablogging-26-december-2018/#daphne-koller-and-the-methods) not having put in the hours to get much farther into [_Probabilistic Graphical Models: Principles and Techniques_](https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/probabilistic-graphical-models)) was that you _need_ to understand causality in order to predict what interventions will have what effects: variance in rain may be statistically "explained by" variance in mud puddles, but you can't make it rain by turning the hose on. Maybe our feeble state of knowledge is _why_ we don't know how to find reliable large-effect environmental interventions that still yet might exist in the vastness of the space of possible interventions. @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ If you're afraid of purported answers being used as a pretext for oppression, yo Notice how the "not allowing sex and race differences in psychological traits to appear on shared maps is the Schelling point for resistance to sex- and race-based oppression" actually gives us an _explanation_ for _why_ one might reasonably have a sense that there are dread doors that we must not open. Undermining the "everyone is Actually Equal" Schelling point could [catalyze a preference cascade](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/8q8p6n/culture_war_roundup_for_june_11/e0mxwe9/)—a [slide down the slippery slope to the the next Schelling point](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Kbm6QnJv9dgWsPHQP/schelling-fences-on-slippery-slopes), which might be a lot worse than the _status quo_ on the "amount of rape and genocide" metric, even if it does slightly better on "estimating heritability coefficients." The orthodoxy isn't just being dumb for no reason. In analogy, Galileo and Darwin weren't _trying_ to undermine Christianity—they had much more interesting things to think about—but religious authorities were _right_ to fear heliocentrism and evolution: if the prevailing coordination equilibrium depends on lies, then telling the truth _is_ a threat and it _is_ disloyal. And if the prevailing coordination equilibrium is basically _good_, then you can see why purported truth-tellers striking at the heart of the faith might be believed to be evil. -Murray opens the parts of the book about sex and race with acknowledgements of the injustice of historical patriarchy ("When the first wave of feminism in the United States got its start [...] women were rebelling not against mere inequality, but against near-total leagl subservience to men") and racial oppression ("slavery experienced by Africans in the New World went far beyond legal constraints [...] The freedom granted by emancipation in America was only marginally better in practice and the situation improved only slowly through the first half of the twentieth century"). It feels ... defensive? Coerced? It probably _is_ coerced. (To his credit, Murray is generally pretty forthcoming about how the need to write "defensively" shaped the book, as in a sidebar in the introduction that says that he's prefer to say a lot more about evopsych, but he chose to just focus on empirical findings in order to avoid the charge of telling "just-so stories.") +Murray opens the parts of the book about sex and race with acknowledgements of the injustice of historical patriarchy ("When the first wave of feminism in the United States got its start [...] women were rebelling not against mere inequality, but against near-total legal subservience to men") and racial oppression ("slavery experienced by Africans in the New World went far beyond legal constraints [...] The freedom granted by emancipation in America was only marginally better in practice and the situation improved only slowly through the first half of the twentieth century"). It feels ... defensive? Coerced? It probably _is_ coerced. (To his credit, Murray is generally pretty forthcoming about how the need to write "defensively" shaped the book, as in a sidebar in the introduction that says that he's prefer to say a lot more about evopsych, but he chose to just focus on empirical findings in order to avoid the charge of telling "just-so stories.") But this kind of defensive half-measure satisfies no one. From the oblivious-science-nerd perspective—the view that agrees with Murray that "everyone should calm down"—you shouldn't _need_ to genuflect to the memory of some historical injustice before you're allowed to talk about Science. But from the perspective that cares about Justice and not just Truth, an _insincere_ gesture or a strategic concession is all the more dangerous insofar as it could function as camoflage for a nefarious hidden agenda. If your work is explicitly aimed at _destroying the anti-oppression Schelling-point belief_, a few hand-wringing historical interludes and bromides about human equality having no testable implications (!!) aren't going to clear you of the suspicion that you're _doing it on purpose_—trying to destroy the anti-oppression Schelling point in order to oppress, not because anything that can be destroyed by the truth, should be. @@ -142,4 +142,4 @@ To speak to those who aren't _already_ oblivious science nerds—or are committe I don't want to be complicit with hatred or oppression. I want to stay loyal to the underlying egalitarian–individualist axiology that makes the blank slate doctrine _sound like a good idea_. But I also want to understand reality, to make sense of things. I want a world that's not lying to me. Having to believe false things—or even just not being able _say_ certain true things when they would otherwise be relevant—extracts a _dire_ cost on our ability to make sense of the world, because you can't just censor a few forbidden hypotheses—[you have to censor everything that _implies_ them](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wyyfFfaRar2jEdeQK/entangled-truths-contagious-lies), and everything that implies _them_: the more adept you are at making logical connections, [the more of your mind you need to excise to stay in compliance](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/XTWkjCJScy2GFAgDt/dark-side-epistemology). -We can't talk about group differences, for fear that belief in differences will be abused to shore up oppression. But ... structural oppression and actual group differences can _both exist at the same time_. They're not contradicting each other! Like, the fact that men are physically stronger than women is _not unrelated_ to the persistence of patriarchy! That doesn't mean patriarchy is good! [(You can't derive an _ought_ from an _is_.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#io) This is pretty obvious, really? +We can't talk about group differences, for fear that belief in differences will be abused to shore up oppression. But ... structural oppression and actual group differences can _both exist at the same time_. They're not contradicting each other! Like, the fact that men are physically stronger than women (on average, but the effect size is really big, like _d_ ≈ [TODO: size] for [TODO: operationalization]) is _not unrelated_ to the persistence of patriarchy! That doesn't mean patriarchy is good! [(You can't derive an _ought_ from an _is_.)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#io) This is pretty obvious, really? diff --git a/notes/human-diversity-notes.md b/notes/human-diversity-notes.md index 0f6a6c9..f7911d6 100644 --- a/notes/human-diversity-notes.md +++ b/notes/human-diversity-notes.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ * structural oppression and actual differences can both exist at the same time! They're not contradicting each other! * I don't know how to build a better world, but my first step is to go a little meta and talk about why we can't talk, and take seriously the possible harms from talking, rather than just asserting that free speech and civil discourse is Actually Good the way the likes of Cofnas/Winegard/Murray do (being a nobody blogger probably helps; I have an excuse) + * women and courage * A few things are actually _worse_ than the ball-hiders make it seem ("treat ppl as individuals" doesn't work; "IQ isn't morally valuable" doesn't work) * Embryo selection looks _really important_; I don't want to give amunition to racists, but I need to talk about that—and the recent Dawkins brouhaha says we can't even talk about that; and the ways I'm worried about eugenics being misused aren't even on the radar diff --git a/notes/notes.txt b/notes/notes.txt index 4eee495..03e19d5 100644 --- a/notes/notes.txt +++ b/notes/notes.txt @@ -1730,3 +1730,21 @@ Everyone wants to think they're an agent that's made an informed choice. And whe From the inside, you have free choice in the sense that you don't know what you're going to do until you've finished computing it. From the outside, you're a system that can be gamed. You're always going to be dominated by _someone's_ memeplex. The question is, if you knew more and thought faster, which parts of your current ideology would extrapolated-you construe as parasites, and which as symbiotes? You should, of course, be very suspicious of anyone who thinks they already know the answer. But perhaps it should not be seen as such a incursion to suggest that the answer may surprise you! + +---- + +(Note the clarifying edit Alexander added at the bottom of the post, albeit only after I [threatened to escalate the civil war in our robot cult and spent Christmas Day yelling at him about it](https://www.greaterwrong.com/posts/bSmgPNS6MTJsunTzS/maybe-lying-doesn-t-exist/comment/xEan6oCQFDzWKApt7). I'm not proud of my social behavior here, but when everyone you used to trust is seemingly insistent on selectively playing dumb about their own philosophy of language in a way that's optimized to trick you into cutting your dick off (independently of the empirical facts that determine whether cutting your dick off is a good idea), you tend to get desperate.) + +---- + +"I don't think you're giving my past self enough credit." + +"You were brainwashed by the Malevolent Authority." + +"I mean, yes, but you can't brainwash a human with random bits; they have to be _specific_ bits with something _good_ in them." + +---- + +https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16488877 +> independent of the masculinizing effects of gonadal secretions, XY and XX brain cells have different patterns of gene expression that influence their differentiation and function + diff --git a/notes/post_ideas.txt b/notes/post_ideas.txt index d92bd71..41be84c 100644 --- a/notes/post_ideas.txt +++ b/notes/post_ideas.txt @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ +_ The Reverse Murray Rule _ Teleology (UUT) +_ Jesus Two _ Book Review: Charles Murray's Human Diversity (UUT) _ Hrunkner Unnerby and the Shallowness of Progress @@ -15,7 +17,6 @@ _ Contra Scott Alexander on Mental Illness; Or, Oh God, Please Don't (aAL/LW) Discord comment about creating a space where no one questions whether someone deserves real woman status - Angelic Irony Memetics vs. Discourse -- 2.17.1