+I would rather say that's a sign that we're facing an instance of the [Sorites paradox](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/), the ancient challenge to applying discrete categories to a continuous world. If one grain of sand doesn't make a heap (the argument goes), and the addition of one more grain of sand can't change whether something is a heap, then we can conclude from [the principle of mathematical induction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_induction) that no number _n_ ∈ ℕ of grains make a heap. (Or, alternatively, that the absence of any sand constitutes a ["heap of zero grains"](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/nso8WXdjHLLHkJKhr/the-conscious-sorites-paradox).) Analogously, if a sufficiently small change in MtF transition outcome can't change whether someone is a woman, then we are seemingly forced to accept that either everyone is a woman or no one is.
+
+While the Sorites paradox is certainly an instructive exercise in the philosophy of language, its practical impact seems limited: most people find it more palatable to conclude that that the heap-ness is a somewhat fuzzy concept, rather than to concede that the argument isn't actually about the amount of sand in a location. And if you brought a single grain of sand when someone asked you for a heap, they probably wouldn't hesitate to say, "That's not what I meant by _heap_ in this context _and you know it_."
+
+> If that's the side of this question you come down on, then I encourage you to ask yourself why that trans women still doesn't count. I expect that whatever your answer, that's the real definition you’re using, not "biological".
+
+I definitely agree that this is a valuable thought experiment: in this limit of perfect physical transition technology, what possible reasons could there be to deny that trans women are women? Allow me to give a conditional answer.
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+_If_ psychological sex differences aren't real, then there aren't any: _ex hypothesi_, the physiological differences between females and males are the only thing for the word _woman_ to attach to, and _ex hypothesi_, we know how to fix those.
+
+Alternatively, _if_ psychological sex differences _are_ a thing, _and_ transness is a brain intersex condition such that pre-transition trans women are _already_ psychologically female, then again, there aren't any: _ex hypothesi_ _&c._
+
+However, _if_ we should be so unlucky to live in a world in which psychological sex differences _are_ a thing _and_ most trans women are motivated to transition by [some _other_ reason](http://www.annelawrence.com/autogynephilia_&_MtF_typology.html) than already having female minds, then we face some subtleties: if our thought-experimental perfect transition tech doesn't edit minds, then we end up with a bunch of female-bodied people with a distribution of psychologies that isn't just not-identical to that of natal females, but is actually coming out of the _male_ distribution. Should such people be called women? Honestly, I lean towards _Yes_, but I can at least _see the argument_ of someone who preferred not to use the word that way.
+
+Wrapping up—
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+> 3) What does this definition of 'woman' get you?
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+It gets us a concept to refer to the set of adult human females. (Even if, again, we often also use the word _woman_ in a broader trans-inclusive sense; it's not uncommon for words to have both narrower and broader definitions which can be distinguished from context.)