+But I was _more_ interested in replying to the part about me being ill-shaped to another's purpose. (I said that I wouldn't have considered that on-topic for the fiction server, but if _he_ thought it was on-topic, then it made sense for me to reply—and I did so at 12:26 _p.m._ the next day, after some time to think. Discord lends itself quite well to a mix of synchronous and asynchronous communication, depending on when people happen to be at their computers.)
+
+I said that he seemed _really_ stuck on this hypothesis that it was Michael Vassar's fault that I'd been shaped into an alienated and angry thing.
+
+To be clear, I totally agreed that I had been shaped into an alienated and an alienated and angry thing. Obviously. But speaking of people "look[ing] inside themselves and correctly see[ing] that this is not how they work" (as Yudkowsky had said earlier), I thought he was getting the causality all wrong.
+
+It seemed to _me_ that the reason I had become an alienated and angry thing is because I had been shaped by [making an extraordinary effort](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/GuEsfTpSDSbXFiseH/make-an-extraordinary-effort) since 2016 to respond to a class of things that included Yudkowsky "mak[ing] up sophisticated stories for why pretty obviously true things are false"—again referencing Oliver Habryka's comment on "Challenges to Yudkowsky's Pronoun Reform Proposal."
+
+That's the context in which it wasn't surprising that my Art had involved some amount of specialization in "detecting whose monkey-side they seem to be on." In a world where monkeys are trying to cover up otherwise-obvious truths, successfully blowing the whistle on them involves being sensitive to their monkey games; figuring out the truth they're trying to cover up is the easy part. The whistleblowing-skill of of promoting otherwise-obvious things to _common_ knowledge in opposition to a Power trying to prevent common knowledge, is different from the science-skill of figuring out organically-nonobvious things from scratch. It _makes sense_ for Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrey Kolmogorov—or for that matter, John Galt and Robert Stadler—to have developed different crystalized skills.
+
+(Indeed, it even makes sense for Kolmogorov and Stadler to _not_ develop some skills, because the skills would show up under Detect Thoughts.)
+
+If it was all Michael's fault for "extensively meta-gas[lighting me] into believing that everyone generally and [him] personally [were] engaging in some kind of weird out-in-the-open gaslighting", I asked, echoing Yudkowsky's language from earlier (with appropriate quotation marks and brackets),[^gaslighting] then _how come Oli could see it, too?_
+
+[^gaslighting]: In particular, Yudkowsky was the one who introduced the word _gaslighting_ into the conversation; I hadn't previously used the word myself.
+
+Yudkowsky replied:
+
+> I think if you asked Oli about the state of reality with respect to this whole affair, he'd have a very different take from your take, _if you're still able to hear differences instead of only those similarities you demand._
+
+That sounded like an easy enough experimental test! I wrote Habryka an email explaining the context, and asking him what "very different take" he might have, if any. (I resisted the temptation to start a [Manifold market](https://manifold.markets/) first.) As I mentioned in the email, I didn't expect to have a very different take from him _about the state of reality_. ("Zack is (still?!) very upset about this, but Oli mostly doesn't care" is a values-difference, not a disagreement about the state of reality.) I didn't think I disagreed with _Yudkowsky_ much about the state of reality! (In his own account, he thought it was "sometimes personally prudent [...] to post your agreement with Stalin about things you actually agree with Stalin about", and I believed him; I was just unhappy about some of the side-effects of his _prudence_.)
+
+Oliver didn't reply. (I might have guessed the wrong email address, out of the two I had on file for him?) I don't blame him; it might have been timelessly ungrateful of me to ask. (The reason people are reluctant to make on-the-record statements in politically charged contexts is because they're afraid the statements will be _used_ to drag them into more political fights later. He had already done me a huge favor by being brave enough to state the obvious in March; I had no right to demand anything more of him.)
+
+Regarding my quick reply about Cheliax's structural disadvantage, Yudkowsky said it was "okay as one element", but complained that the characters had already observed it out loud, and that I "didn't name any concrete sequence of events that bore it out or falsified it." He continued:
+
+> I think you could find a lot more than this if your brain were still able to see incongruent facts as well as only congruent facts. what does the underlying reality of Planecrash think about your Most Important Issues? what is shown, but maybe never even told at all? you gave the reply of somebody who can _only_ see social realities and _only_ what people say and not what _just happens, at all_, even inside a story, you didn't say _a thing that happened._
+
+At this point, I was a bit suspicious that _any_ answer that wasn't exactly whatever he was thinking of would be dismissed as too social or too inferentially close to something one of the characters had said. What did it mean for the _universe_ to say something about valorizing truth?
+
+The original prompt ("What are some of the ways _Planecrash_ valorizes truth") had put me into 11th-grade English class mode; the revision "if I ask you, not what any _character_ says [...]" made me think the 11th-grade English teacher expected a different answer. Now the revised–revised prompt "what does the underlying reality of _Planecrash_ think about your Most Important Issues?", with the previous rebukes in my context window, was making me think I should be reaching for an act of philosophical [Original Seeing](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/SA79JMXKWke32A3hG/original-seeing), rather than trying to be a diligent schoolstudent playing the 11th-grade English class game. I thought about it ... and I _saw something_.
+
+_Thesis_: the universe of _Planecrash_ is saying that virtue ethics—including, as a special case, my virtue ethics about it being good to tell the truth and reveal information—are somewhat unnatural.
+
+In the story, the god Adabar values trading fairly, even with those who can't verify that their partners are keeping up their end of the deal,[^trade-verification] and also wants to promote fair trading _elsewhere_ in Reality (as contrasted to just being fair Himself).
+
+[^trade-verification]: Significantly, this is somewhat "unnatural" behavior according to Yudkowsky's view of decision theory. Ideal agents are expected to cooperate with agents whose cooperation is _conditional_ on their own cooperation, not simply those that cooperate with them: you "should" defect against a rock with the word "COOPERATE" painted on it, and you "shouldn't" trade for what you could just as easily steal. See §6 of ["Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic"](https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.5577).
+
+Adabar is kind of a weirdo. He's not a vanishly rare freak (whose specification would require lots of uncompressible information); there _is_ a basin of attraction in the space of pre-gods, where creatures who develop a computationally efficient "fairness" heuristic in their ancestral environment and reify that into their utilityfunction when they ascend to divinity, but it's not a _huge_ basin of attraction; most gods aren't like Adabar.
+
+It's the same thing with honesty. Generic consequentialists have no reason to "tell the truth" to agents with different utility functions when they're not under compact and being compensated for the service. Why _would_ you emit signals that other agents can interpret as a map that reflects the territory? [You can't get more paperclips that way!](https://arbital.com/p/not_more_paperclips/)
+
+I had previously written about this in ["Commucation Requires Common Interests or Differential Signal Costs"](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ybG3WWLdxeTTL3Gpd/communication-requires-common-interests-or-differential); you needed some common interests in order for flexible, "digital" language to exist at all. ("Digital" language being that for which the relationship between signals and meaning can be arbitrary, in contrast to costly signaling, where me expending resources at least tell you that I could afford those resources.)
+
+It's _possible_ for imperfectly deceptive social organisms to develop a taste for "honesty" as a computationally efficient heuristic for navigating to Pareto improvements in the ancestral environment, which _might_ get reified into the utilityfunction as they ascend—but that's an Adabar-class weird outcome, not the default outcome.
+
+So—insofar as my Most Important Issues revolved around an obsession with motivational transparency, wanting to live in a world that wasn't lying to me, wanting to _reveal information_ as an end in itself, unilaterally rather than only as part of a coordinated negotiation scheme, without necessarily being _paid_ for it, but just because it is _right_ ...
+
+It seems like my answer to the question of, "What does the underlying causal process of _Planecrash_ think about your Most Important Issues; what are some the ways that _Planecrash_ valorizes truth-telling as you, yourself, see that virtue?" is, "It doesn't" (!). Truth-telling is a virtue ethic, and _Planecrash_ depicts a universe ruled by consequentialist gods who only implement virtue ethics insofar as that made it into their utilityfunction.
+
+I realized, of course, that this certainly wasn't the answer Yudkowsky was looking for. But it seemed like a _better_ answer than me trying to play the schoolstudent. He asked what I saw when I looked at what the fictional universe was saying about my problems, and I looked, and _I saw something_. (Something philosophically substantive, definitely not just a social reality.) It seemed more honest to just report that, rather than keep trying to [guess the teacher's password](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/NMoLJuDJEms7Ku9XS/guessing-the-teacher-s-password).
+
+("Hermione knew the correct answer wouldn't impress Professor Quirrell, but it was the correct answer, so she said it.")
+
+So, after sleeping on it first, I posted the explanation of what I saw to the channel (including the parts about how the original prompts steered me, and that I realized that this wasn't the answer he was looking for).
+
+The outcome was—silence. No response from Yudkowsky in several days. Maybe I shouldn't have ran with my Original Seeing answer? I showed the transcripts to a friend, who compared my answer about consequentialist gods to including a list of your country's war crimes in a high school essay assignment about patriotism; I had done a terrible job of emitting symbols that made me a good monkey, and a mediocre-at-best job of flipping the table (rejecting Yudkowsky's "pass my test before I recognize your criticism as legitimate" game) and picking a fight instead.
+
+("Don't look at me," he added, "I would've flipped the table at the beginning.")
+
+I tried to explain that my third answer wasn't _just_ doubling down on my previous thesis: "my virtue ethics run against the grain of the hidden Bayesian structure of reality" wasn't an argument _in favor of_ my virtue ethics. My friend wasn't buying it; I still hadn't been fulfilling the original prompt.
+
+He had me there. I had no more excuses after that: I had apparently failed the test. I was feeling pretty glum about this, and lamented my poor performance in the `#drama` channel of another Discord server (that Yudkowsky was also a member of). I had thought I was doing okay—I definitely _didn't_ say, "That's impossible because Big Yud and Linta are lying liars who hate Truth", and there were reasons why my Original Seeing answer made sense _to me_ as a thing to say, but _that wasn't what I was being tested on_. It _genuinely_ looked bad in context. I had failed in [my ambition to know how it looks](/2022/context-is-for-queens/#knowing-how-that-looks).
+
+I think Yudkowsky saw the #drama messages (he left an emoji-reaction in the relevant timespan of messages) and took pity on me.
+
+[TODO: summarize teacher feedback]
+
+[TODO: summarize my admitting that it did have something to do with my state of mind; I would have done better by giving the 11th grade English class algorithm more compute; Peranza's username was 'not-looking-there'!; proposed revision]
+
+[TODO: C.S. Lewis speech]
+
+I said that I thought it was significant that the particular problem to which my Art had been shaped (in some ways) and misshaped (in others) wasn't just a matter of people being imperfect. Someone at the 2021 Event Horizon Independence Day party had told me that people couldn't respond to my arguments because of the obvious political incentives. And I guessed—the angry question I wanted to ask, since I didn't immediately know how to rephrase it to not be doing the angry monkey thing was, was I supposed to _take that lying down?_
+
+**Eliezer** — 12/17/2022 5:50 PM
+you sure are supposed to not get angry at the people who didn't create those political punishments
+that's insane
+they're living in Cheliax and you want them to behave like they're not in Cheliax and get arrested by the Church
+your issue is with Asmodeus. take it to Him, and if you can't take Him down then don't blame others who can't do that either.
+
+Admirably explicit.
+
+[TODO: Yudkowsky's story: the story is about Keltham trusting Cheliax wrongly; leaving that part out is politicized; other commenters pick up on "But you're still saying to trust awesome institutions"]
+
+[TODO: I think there's a bit of question-substitution going on; the reason the virtue of evenness is important is because if you only count arguments for and not against the hypothesis, you mess up your beliefs about the hypothesis; if you substitute a different question "Is Yudkowsky bad?"/"Am I a good coder?", that's a bucket error—or was he "correctly" sensing that the real question was "Is Yudkowsky bad?"]
+
+[TODO: I express my fully-updated grievance (this doesn't seem to be in the transcript I saved??); I hadn't consciously steered the conversation this way, but the conversation _bounced_ in a way that made it on-topic; that's technically not my fault, even if the elephant in my brain was optimizing for this outcome.
+
+The fact that Yudkowsky had been replying to me at length—explaining why my literary criticism was nuts, but in a way that respected my humanity and expected me to be able to hear it—implied that I was apparently in his "I can cheaply save him (from crazy people like Michael)" bucket, rather than the "AI timelines and therefore life is too short" bucket.]
+
+[TODO: I think it's weird that Yudkowsky's reaction is "that's insane"; he should be able to understand why someone might consider this a betrayal, even if he didn't think he was bound to that level of service; the story of a grant-making scientist]
+
+[TODO: I bait Lintamande into engagement]
+
+[TODO: Linta says I'm impossible to talk to and the anticipation of my pouncing stiffles discussion. (I almost wonder if this is a good thing, from a _realpolitik_ perspective? I'd prefer to argue people out of bad ideas, but if the threat of an argument disincentivizes them from spreading ...? Game theory goes both ways—I've been self-censoring to.)]
+
+[TODO: I agreed that this was good feedback about my social behavior; I don't intellectually disagree that different cultures are different; I'm super-fighty because I'm super-traumatized; the thing I'm trying to keep on Society's shared map is, Biological Sex Actually Exists and Is Sometimes Decision-Relevant; Biological Sex Actually Exists and is Sometimes Decision-Relevant Even When It Makes People Sad; Biological Sex Actually Exists Even When a Prediction Market Says It Will Make People Sad; Linta agrees; Eliezer responds with a +1 emoji]
+
+[TODO: "like, if you just went and found Eliezer!2004 and were like 'hey, weird sci fi hypothetical'
+_speaking of the year 2004_; the thing I'm at war with is that I don't think he would _dare_ publish the same essay today
+]