* structural oppression and actual differences can both exist at the same time! They're not contradicting each other!
- * People who are mad at Murray about this book aren't really bad about the SNP scatterplots; they're still mad about Ch. 13 and 14 of _The Bell Curve_, and they think Murray is "hiding the ball"
* I don't know how to build a better world, but my first step is to go a little meta and talk about why we can't talk, and take seriously the possible harms from talking, rather than just asserting that free speech and civil discourse is Actually Good the way the likes of Cofnas/Winegard/Murray do (being a nobody blogger probably helps; I have an excuse)
* A few things are actually _worse_ than the ball-hiders make it seem ("treat ppl as individuals" doesn't work; "IQ isn't morally valuable" doesn't work)
* Embryo selection looks _really important_; I don't want to give amunition to racists, but I need to talk about that—and the recent Dawkins brouhaha says we can't even talk about that; and the ways I'm worried about eugenics being misused aren't even on the radar
+* Murray says polygenic scores are like GDP ... I bet Ben and Michael would have something to say about that analogy!
+* "genders have been identified"
* need to talk about individual differences being non-threatening
[parental SES also tracks parental genes]
-Murray says polygenic scores are like GDP ... I bet Ben and Michael would have something to say about that analogy!
+
Cognitive Enhancement and Network Effects: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11406-020-00189-3
And, again, socio-psychological facts like character assessments are precisely those for which we have the _most_ reason to distrust each other's judgement: if I like Mary, I might say favorable but false things about her even if I would never tell a lie about homotopy groups. In the absence of a objectively calibrated compassion-o-meter, psychological scientists who want to study individual differences in compassion are mostly limited to doing statistics on people's verbal self-reports and other-reports—but if you don't trust what people _say_, it's at least not _obvious_ whether or how much more you should trust statistical analyses of what people say, in accordance with the ancient dictum: ["garbage in, garbage out."](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garbage_in,_garbage_out) Probably the neuroscientists are working on the compassion-o-meter, but they too face the problem of ensuring that their interpretations of their brain scans actually mean what they say they mean.
+
+Jensen—
+> the test must measure, in addition to the construct it purports to measure,
+some other characteristic or factor that is completely uncorrelated with the construct and on which the major group, on the average, exceeds the minor group A typical example is the case in which the major and minor groups differ in their native language. A person’s native language is presumably not correlated with the construct of intelligence. If the test involves the native language of the major group exclusively and the minor group has a different language, the test will most likely be positively biased in favor of the major group. In other words, the test is measuring something (in this case a specific language) in addition to the construct that it purports to measure, which condition favors the major group
+
+https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Intelligence_Test_of_Cultural_Homogeneity
+
+Draw-a-Horse Pueblo
+
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This was the linkpost description text I initially drafted, before deciding that the "Straussian coyness" I [occasionally]() [succumb]() to is ultimately unbecoming.
projects / Ultimately_Untrue_Thought.git / blobdiff