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-TODO: talk up front about the lameness of the causality-blindness as a response to steelmanned charges of systemic racism
-(The aim of the book is to argue that intelligence and crime differences _exist_ as not _trivially_ mutable facts of our world, as contrasted to the theory that outcome differences are solely due to direct discrimination by employers, schools, and the justice system; the strawman of "And this is 100% genetic" is not implied—not that "And this seems likely to be somewhere between 40–80% genetic" would be more than 40–80% less unpalatable.) [TODO: "Causes are irrelevant" (!) p. 47]
-]
+Unfortunately, I fear Murray's project in _Facing Reality_ is _too_ focused—too _unambitious_—for the purposes he asks of it. (To be fair, social science is hard enough that it makes sense to ask unambitious questions if you want to get the right answer—even if that means the right answer can't help much.) The book argues that intelligence and crime differences [_exist_](https://twitter.com/charlesmurray/status/1409839168281272324) as not-trivially-mutable facts of our world, while remaining agnostic about any particular theory of the _causes_ of the differences. The claim is that different groups _actually do_ commit different amounts of violent crime, and _actually do_ have different distributions of cognitive ability, such that, when the groups end up differently represented in prision or higher education, you can't say that this could only be because cops and teachers are racist towards individuals.
+
+It's important to notice that, contrary to Murray's self-presentation of being only concerned with facts and not causality, this _is_ implicitly making causal claims: it's just that it's specifically making claims about the "crime → imprisonment" and "intelligence → success" links in the [causal graph](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/hzuSDMx7pd2uxFc5w/causal-diagrams-and-causal-models), while remaining silent about the equations underlying the "genes → intelligence ← environment" and "genes → intelligence ← environment" v-structures. But this is a technicality. (If someone with the requisite power and influence were trying to found a discipline of Actual Social Science in our world, one of the obvious first steps would be to hire [Judea Pearl](http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/BOOK-2K/) as a technical reviewer for Murray.) Murray's point is just that even if the trait differences were solely caused by environmental factors like poverty or the cultural legacy of slavery, the differences would still be real and still show up in statistics produced by procedurally fair and non-racist institutions; the strawman of "And the differences are 100% genetic" is expressly not implied. (Not that "And this looks likely to be somewhere between 40–80% genetic" would be more than 40–80% less unpalatable.)
+
+The problem is that this causality-blindness—or not-quite-coherently _attempted_ causality-blindness—is profoundly unsatisfying. The [difference between a causal model and a statistical model](https://academic.oup.com/ije/article/45/6/1895/2999350) is _about_ how the system would respond to interventions; [this isn't something you can dodge](/2021/Feb/you-are-right-and-i-was-wrong-reply-to-tailcalled-on-causality/) if you care about policy and possibilities, rather than just summarizing static facts about a static world. Compiling the stats and arguing that the stats aren't just lies is an important service, and educational to those who aren't already familiar with the stats, but no sophisticated advocate of structural-racism theories is going to have their worldview substantially altered by this book: it's very easy to concede that the trait differences Murray documents are real (not simply made up by lying teacher and cops), but that they would vanish in a sufficiently anti-racist Society, and Murray is _explicilty_ (and reasonably, given how difficult it is) declaring that question out-of-scope. Overall, my impression of _Facing Reality_ is favorable but restrained: I keep finding myself agreeing with Murray "as far as it goes", but thinking that it just doesn't go as far as Murray seems to suggest.