20 Feb: impulsive email to Scott (subject: a howl of despair which is nameless)
20 Feb: cold outreach to Ben Landau-Taylor
21 Feb: telling Marcus, I'm out of cards: we created a monster
-
-
-
-
-> if you applied your considerable capacity for verbally sophisticated interpretive labor to explaining exactly how people are failing to engage with your arguments and what this says about the "Rationalists", rather than why your arguments are valid, something interesting might happen - at least it's much higher probability than trying more of the same.
-(I'm only getting around to this now—sorry Ben)
-
-> Like, you have some implicit model of what Rationalists would do, that keeps getting surprised - you can explain what you'd have expected, and give examples (anonymized if needed) of how those expectations were violated systematically (though not universally).
-
-Ben—
-> A description of the nitpicking as hostile and anti-epistemic can be correct and important even if mentioning that description is not the correct response for you.
-
-
-to Sarah—
-> If we have this entire posse, I feel bad/guilty/ashamed about focusing too much on my special interest except insofar as it's actually a proxy for "has Eliezer and/or everyone else [lost the plot](https://thezvi.wordpress.com/2017/08/12/what-is-rationalist-berkleys-community-culture/), and if so, how do we get it back?"
-
-Ben's reply—
-> Your special interest is not just a coincidence here.
-
-I don't think it's a coincidence, either, but I'd like to get more of a sense of how large the posited "If you once [gerrymander a category boundary], the[n parsimony] is ever after your enemy" effect is.
-
-
-Sarah shying away, my rallying cry—
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-> There have been times during the last few weeks where it's felt like my mind has shut down with the only thought, "What the hell am I _doing_? This is _absurd_. Why am I running around picking fights about the philosophy of language—and worse, with me arguing for the _Bad_ Guys' position? I don't want to be one of the Bad Guys. Maybe I'm wrong and should stop making a fool out of myself. After all, using Aumann-like reasoning, in a dispute of 'Zack M. Davis and Michael Vassar vs. _everyone fucking else_', wouldn't I want to bet on 'everyone else'? Obviously."
-
-> Except that I was raised to believe that you're supposed to concede arguments on the basis of encountering a superior counterargument that makes you change your mind. And I can't actually point to such a counterargument. "Maybe I'm making a fool out of myself by picking fights with all these high-status people" is not a counterargument. When I look at the world, it looks like [Scott](http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/11/21/the-categories-were-made-for-man-not-man-for-the-categories/) and [Eliezer](https://twitter.com/ESYudkowsky/status/1067183500216811521) and [Kelsey](https://theunitofcaring.tumblr.com/post/171986501376/your-post-on-definition-of-gender-and-woman-and) and [Robby Bensinger](https://www.facebook.com/robbensinger/posts/10158073223040447?comment_id=10158073685825447&reply_comment_id=10158074093570447&comment_tracking=%7B%22tn%22%3A%22R2%22%7D) seem to think that some variation on ["I can define a word any way I want"]() is sufficient to end debates on transgender identity.
+22 Feb: "RIP Culture War" thread
+22 Feb: Michael offers advice; I forward with Scott; Michael calls it a destructive move
+25 Feb: first draft of defending against "alt-right" categorization
+27 Feb: more support from the gang
+27-28 Feb: on private universes
+1 Mar: intra-group disagreement re "ambient epistemic violence"
+2 Mar: Michael—independence of perspectives vs. failure to present an united front
+2 Mar: I saw the new Rebel Wilson movie last night, went to Simon's birthday (I remember seeing Scott there), then met Anna
+2 Mar: Anna's comment about Michael
+3 Mar: "Apologies are always intrinsically worthless, but that fact that we are able to legitimately demand an apology means that we can legitimately demand that he look at something."
+3 Mar: I heard Anna say my desire for good arugments to win was "selfish"; what she actually said was "self-centered", "it seems less important than what happens on topics that we don't all know there isn't free speech about."
+3 Mar: "told them that the thing that would most help AI risk from them anyhow was for them to continue on their present career," is that if I try to only focus on "important" things, I'll probably just come up with something fake
+3 Mar: more draft, more thanks for social proof
+5 Mar: Scott gets back to me
+5 Mar: 12 short stories about language (and, expressing regret that I only email Scott when I need something from him)
+6 Mar: SJWs without guns doing this than you are about mostly white men with money, gavels and guns doing it? ... SJW agenda is to play by the same rules as the legal system plays by, and they do it with less support from tradition and from ritual, so it's more obvious,
+6 Mar: much better draft to EY (defending against alt-right)
+10 Mar: send revised draft to EY
+14 Mar: meeting with Ben/Sarah/Marie/Jessica; Ben assist on "Blegg Mode"
+17 Mar: me to Scott, bringing up idea that in-person ideas were better
+17 Mar: Michael characterizing EY as choosing to be a cult leader
+18 Mar: starting to overheat (subject: "strategy huddle II")—
+I referred to Sarah and Ben at Sunday conversation saying in-person meetings were better
+Scott says "I try to avoid in-person meetings in general, and this is probably in my bottom 1% of things that I would enjoy talking about in person"
+I write to my team wondering if I should propose a $4000 happy price
+then I say, maybe don't reply before Friday
+6 p.m.: really angry at Scott for not understanding the difference between cluster in a value-dependent subspace (as with the dagim/fish example), and value-dependent to not make my friends sad. But my boss was expecting code by noon tomorrow
+7 p.m.: let go of the anger somehow and just do my job this week and then write up the mathy version
+8:44 p.m.: fantasizing about recruiting Buck or Duncan to our coalition; never sure how to interpret my self-reports; even when crying, shaking, randomly yelling, &c. I think I'm still noticeably incentivizable: I think that if someone were to present a credible threat (e.g., slapping me and telling me to snap out of it), then I would be able to calm down: there's some sort of game-theory algorithm in the brain that subjectively feels genuine distress (like crying or sending people too many hysterical emails) but only when it can predict that it will be tolerated
+10:27 p.m.: I tweeted a Sequences quote that summarizes how I'm feeling (mention is to attribute credit; Eliezer has so many followers that he probably won't even see the mention notification), except it's not quite appropriate, because the quote is about failure resulting in the need to invent new methods of rationality, better than the ones you were taught. But ... the methods I was taught are great! I don't have a pressing need to improve on them! I just can't cope with everyone else having forgotten!
+11:01 p.m.: OK, the dayjob situation is really bad right now (it's almost 2300), so let's try one of those commitment-contract things. I hereby pledge not to check my personal email, Facebook, or Twitter until 1700 Pacific Daylight time on Friday the twenty-second of March. (I have an /etc/hosts manipulation script and I can turn off my home computer to help.) If I fail in this pledge, then ... um, I'm having trouble thinking of a good incentive here. (Traditionally you use money, but unfortunately, I'm only 78% Ashkenazi and my brain doesn't believe money is real.) So, um, "or else"!
+2:47-3:55 a.m.: some replies from Michael
+4:01 a.m.: I got the unit test passing; why do I keeping lying about email hiatus?
+4:15 a.m.: "predictably bad ideas" email to Anna/Michael/Ben/Sarah/Zvi/Scott/Alicorn/Mike
+5:26 a.m.: five impulsive points
+5:58 a.m.: everyone's first priority should be to make sure Zack can sleep
+6:14 a.m.: I'm really sorry about this. I don't need Scott's help and I think Michael is being a little aggressive about that, but I guess that's also kind of Michael's style?
+6:18 a.m.: Michael's response: What the FUCK Zack!?!
+7:27 a.m.: Home now. Going to get in bed. I could say more, but that would be high-variance, and we don't want variance right now
+19 Mar: Michael seems disappointed with me for what he perceived as me escalating and then deescalating just after he came to help, but which from my perspective felt like me just trying to communicate that I don't want to impose too many costs on my friends just because I felt upset today. (Subject: "yet another strategy huddle (III)")
+19 Mar: Ben writes off Scott and ignores a boundary; nominates Jessica for helping me
+19 Mar: maybe there's a reason to be attached to the "rationalist" brand name/social identity, because my vocabulary has been trained really hard on this subculture; theistic evolution Church analogy
+20 Mar: planning to meet Zvi in person for first time
+20 Mar: Ben asks Scott to alter the beacon (I think this became https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/07/04/some-clarifications-on-rationalist-blogging/ )
+20 Mar: super-proton concession (why now? maybe he saw my "tools shattered" Tweet, or maybe the Quillette article just happened to be timely)
+21 Mar: I think of the proton criticism; nominate Ben as mission commander
+21 Mar: I suggest to Anna that chiming in would be a movement towards peace with Michael's gang
+21 Mar: Ben and Michael don't think the techincal quibble makes any progress
+22 Mar: I literally ran into Scott on the train
+22 Mar: Scott does understand the gerrymandering/unnaturalness problem, but it sort of seems like he doesn't understand that this is about cognitive algorithms rather than verbal behavior ("someone tells you that classifying a burrito as a sandwich will actually save ten million lives and ensure friendly AI in our lifetime, would you still refuse to classify a burrito as a sandwich?"—well, it doesn't matter what I say), whereas Eliezer definitely understands
+24 Mar: Michael to me on Anna as cult leader
+24 Mar: I tell Michael that I might be better at taking his feedback if he's gentler
+30 Mar: hang out with Jessica (previous week was Zvi and Nick and anti-fascist Purim)
+
+
+> When I look at the world, it looks like [Scott](http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/11/21/the-categories-were-made-for-man-not-man-for-the-categories/) and [Eliezer](https://twitter.com/ESYudkowsky/status/1067183500216811521) and [Kelsey](https://theunitofcaring.tumblr.com/post/171986501376/your-post-on-definition-of-gender-and-woman-and) and [Robby Bensinger](https://www.facebook.com/robbensinger/posts/10158073223040447?comment_id=10158073685825447&reply_comment_id=10158074093570447&comment_tracking=%7B%22tn%22%3A%22R2%22%7D) seem to think that some variation on ["I can define a word any way I want"]() is sufficient to end debates on transgender identity.
> And ... I want to be nice to my trans friends, too, but that can't possibly be the definitive end-of-conversation correct argument. Not _really_. Not if you're being serious.
-> But "whatever" is _not a counterargument!_
-
> But I want to live in a rationalist community that can actually _update_—where a bad argument by a high-status person will _eventually_ be publicly known to lose to a superior counterargument, even if the person originating the counterargument is lower status and the counterargument happens to have genuinely unfavorable political implications.
> But ultimately, I've got _something to protect_. This is even more humiliating, really. It's not even a good or wholesome something to protect that you'd feel comfortable blogging about under your own name. It's actually kind of obscene. Good or not, wholesome or not, obscene or not, it's for all the boys like me who had a dream whose proper realization happens to have [_more complicated implementation details_](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/QZs4vkC7cbyjL9XA9/changing-emotions) than applying social pressure to make everyone pretend that they've coordinated to redefine a top-20 word. Those boys deserve to not be lied to.
> I've tried to be pretty explicit about only expecting buy-in for a minimal flag that says, "'I Can Define a Word Any Way I Want' can't be the end of the debate, because choosing to call things different names doesn't change the empirical cluster-structure of bodies and minds in the world; while the same word might legitimately be used with different definitions/extensions in different contexts
-> I do want to distinguish between direct ideological conformity enforcement attempts, and "people not living up to their usual epistemic standards in response to ideological conformity enforcement in the general culture." So-called "rationalists" are actually very good at not-being-persecutory! (I don't think I'd be saying this in the nearby possible world where Scott Siskind didn't have a traumatizing social-justice-shaming experience in college, but it's true here.)
-
-> I want to emphasize this, because I don't want to fall into the [bravery-debate](http://slatestarcodex.com/2013/05/18/against-bravery-debates/) trap of, "Look at me, I'm so heroically persecuted, therefore I'm right (therefore you should have sex with me)."
-
-> My hope has been that it's possible to apply just enough "What the fuck kind of rationalist are you?!" social pressure to cancel out the "You don't want to be a Bad (Red) person, do you??" social pressure and thereby let people look at the arguments. I don't know if that actually works.
-
> I keep thinking of the part where Dagny entreats the great Dr. Robert Stadler to denounce a not-technically-lying statement by the State Science Institute
> Imagine your friends got a new front porch installed on your house, and you noticed that the boards were smoother and shinier than you expected. A question you might then ask your friend is, "Oh, is this real wood, or one of those wood-plastic composites?"
> In phrasing it that way, you're not saying that composites are bad; it's just that it makes sense to use language to asymmetrically distinguish between the natural thing that already existed, and the synthetic thing that has been deliberately engineered to resemble the original thing as much as possible.
-
-I deeply appreciate your effort here Zack. I think that the link-filled argument structure you have presented here is sufficiently compelling that for someone who is moved to action by arguments, who believes in the original mission of the rationalist community either narrowly or broadly defined, and who doesn't believe that The Craft Is Not The Community, (https://www.google.es/amp/s/srconstantin.wordpress.com/2017/08/08/the-craft-is-not-the-community/amp/) there is little room for productive rebuttal. However, much to my regret, I don't discover in myself an expectation of the sort of action you are hoping for which is very different from your 20% estimate, but I do discover a much lower confidence in that action's success than is suggested by the "you alone can kill it" invocation. It could be true. Conditional on the right set of qualifications it probably is true, but that set of qualifications includes some assumptions about how much effort would be invested and about how other people would respond which I see as much less likely than not.
+The Craft Is Not The Community, (https://srconstantin.wordpress.com/2017/08/08/the-craft-is-not-the-community/amp/)
+Anyway, meanwhile, other conversations were happening.
-> I think that this is a pretty overwhelming argument from an analytic perspective. I'm not expecting that such a perspective will move Eliezer's actions right now, but I badly want to help him to get back to being the sort of person who would be moved by such an argument. I suspect that if something like this can enjoy sent out at a time several weeks away, it will contribute more to Eliezer once again being the sort of person who is influenced by this sort of argument. Can you wait a bit? Is it possiblefot is and some friends to steer the state of the discussion further in the direction you are hoping for before sharing this letter with him?
-
-Anyway, meanwhile, other conversations were happening. Anna told me that my "You have to pass my litmus test or I lose all respect for you as a rationalist" attitude was psychologically coercive. I agreed—I was even willing to go up to "violent"—in the sense that it's [trying to apply social incentives towards an outcome rather than merely exchanging information](http://zackmdavis.net/blog/2017/03/an-intuition-on-the-bayes-structural-justification-for-free-speech-norms/). But sometimes you need to use violence in defense of self or property, even if violence is generally bad. If we think of the "rationalist" label as intellectual property, maybe it's property worth defending, and if so, then "I can define a word any way I want" isn't obviously a terrible time to start shooting at the bandits? What makes my "... or I lose all respect for you as a rationalist" moves worthy of your mild reproach, but "You're not allowed to call this obviously biologically-female person a woman, or I lose all respect for you as not-an-asshole" merely a puzzling sociological phenomenon that might be adaptive in some not-yet-understood way? Isn't the violence-structure basically the same? Is there any room in civilization for self-defense?
-
-When I told Michael about this, he said that I was ethically or 'legally' in the right here, and the rationalist equivalent of a lawyer mattered more for my claims than the equivalent of a scientist, and that Ben Hoffman (who I had already shared the thread with Scott with) would be helpful in solidifying my claims to IP defense. I said that I didn't _feel_ like I'm in the right, even if I can't point to a superior counterargument that I want to yield to, just because I'm getting fatigued from all the social-aggression I've been doing. (If someone tries to take your property and you shoot at them, you could be said to be the "aggressor" in the sense that you fired the first shot, even if you hope that the courts will uphold your property claim later.)
Michael—
> Ben once told me that conversation with me works like this. I try to say things that are literally true and people bend over backwards to pretend to agree but to think that I am being metaphorical.
(I _want_ to confidently predict that everything I've just said is completely obvious to you, because I learned it all specifically from you! A 130 IQ _nobody_ like me shouldn't have to say _any_ of this to the _author_ of "A Human's Guide to Words"! But then I don't know how to reconcile that with your recent public statement about [not seeing "how there's scientific truth at stake"](https://twitter.com/ESYudkowsky/status/1067482047126495232). Hence this desperate and [_confused_](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5JDkW4MYXit2CquLs/your-strength-as-a-rationalist) email plea.)
-And I'm still really confused, because I still feel like everything I'm saying here is a trivial application of Sequences-lore. If I'm getting something wrong, I should be overjoyed to be harshly corrected by the Great Teacher! A simple person like me is as but a mere worm in the presence of the great Eliezer Yudkowsky! But if it looks like the Great Teacher is getting something wrong (wrong with respect to the balanced flow of arguments and evidence in which every "step is precise and has no room in it for your whims", although not wrong in the sense of making a factually incorrect statement) and the Great Teacher neither corrects me nor says "OK, you're right and I was wrong, well done, my student", what am I supposed to conclude? Is this a prank—a test? Am I like Brennan in "Initiation Ceremony", being evaluated to see if I have the guts to stand by my vision of the Way in the face of social pressure? (If so, I'm not doing a very good job, because I definitely wouldn't be writing this if I hadn't gotten social proof from Michael, Ben, and Sarah.) Did I pass??
+And I'm still really confused, because I still feel like everything I'm saying here is a trivial application of Sequences-lore. If I'm getting something wrong, I should be overjoyed to be harshly corrected by the Great Teacher! A simple person like me is as but a mere worm in the presence of the great Eliezer Yudkowsky! But if it looks like the Great Teacher is getting something wrong (wrong with respect to the balanced flow of arguments and evidence in which every "step is precise and has no room in it for your whims", although not wrong in the sense of making a factually incorrect statement) and the
+
+
+
+Great Teacher neither corrects me nor says "OK, you're right and I was wrong, well done, my student", what am I supposed to conclude? Is this a prank—a test? Am I like Brennan in "Initiation Ceremony", being evaluated to see if I have the guts to stand by my vision of the Way in the face of social pressure? (If so, I'm not doing a very good job, because I definitely wouldn't be writing this if I hadn't gotten social proof from Michael, Ben, and Sarah.) Did I pass??
In a functioning rationalist community, there should never be any occasion in which "appeal to Eliezer Yudkowsky's personal authority" seems like a good strategy: the way this is supposed to work is that I should just make my arguments with the understanding that good arguments will be accepted and bad arguments will be rejected. But I've been trying that, and it's mostly not working. On any other topic, I probably would have just given up and accepted the social consensus by now: "Sure, OK, whatever, trans women are women by definition; who am I to think I've seen into the Bayes-structure?" I still think this from time to time, and feel really guilty about arguing for the Bad Guys (because in my native Blue Tribe culture, only Bad people want to talk about sexual dimorphism). But then I can't stop seeing the Bayes-structure that says that biological sex continues to be a predictively-useful concept even when it's ideologically unfashionable—and I've got Something to Protect. What am I supposed to do?
f you want people to use your preferred categories, you're going to need to convince them with some sort of argument that those categories are predictively useful. I don't see the point of saying "There's no epistemic issue here, although maybe there's a policy debate about how to use language; end-of-discussion" if it's not to justify the mind games? Why can't we get a clear ex cathedra statement that gender categories are not an exception to the rule that categories are nonarbitrary? Isn't it true, and important, and something that people who ought to know better are getting wrong? Surely there's some way for "not alt-right" signaling to be purchased separately?
+
+
+
[TODO: Ben—
> I am pretty worried that if I actually point out the physical injuries sustained by some of the smartest, clearest-thinking, and kindest people I know in the Rationalist community as a result of this sort of thing, I'll be dismissed as a mean person who wants to make other people feel bad.
I'm still pretty horrified that the sticking point in discussions seems to have been not the AGP etiology itself (which is what I was focusing on in 2016/2017), but the category-boundaries-are-arbitrary "insight." So it's not just that we failed to break the irrationalist trans ideology: we actually invented something arguably worse! (Ordinary trans activists at least try to make (confused) truth claims; we invented a fully general counteragument against truth claims that's all the more dangerous thanks to the virtue of a very narrow kind of technical correctness.)
+> point out to him your sympathies regarding his mental breakdown under soft political persecution and silencing, make it clear that you are not requesting that he now or at any time in the future do anything in public regarding gender issues, and ask him to remember that you have recently been mentally incarcerated more than under similar political pressure (applied in the name of the mental health needs of non-specific people many of whom are in the same natural category as yourself) that he is totally forgiven for participating in it, but that you would like to discuss the shared aspect of your circumstances face to face, and maybe both consider not posting anything online for a couple weeks.
+
+> That was a fairly destructive move to pull without consulting me, but OK, you played it and I will run with it.
+
+(Notwithstanding how it's bad that I've been leaning on you for social proof way too much, I've been writing with the assumption that the author of the Sequences still cares about the common interest of many causes. I can see the "MIRI exists, that was all the raising-the-sanity-waterline project turned out to be good for; I don't have any teaching duties besides my not-explicitly-lying Wizard's Oath" CDT logic, but ... ugh, really? I can't be the one to suggest it.)
+
+
+
+You write:
+
+ Your annual reminder that Slate Star Codex is not and never was alt-right, every real stat shows as much, and the primary promoters of this lie are sociopaths who get off on torturing incredibly nice targets like Scott A.
+
+Suppose the one were to reply: "Using language in a way you dislike, openly and explicitly and with public focus on the language and its meaning, is not lying. The proposition you claim false (Scott Alexander's explicit advocacy of a white ethnostate?) is not what the speech is meant to convey—and this is known to everyone involved, it is not a secret. You're not standing in defense of truth if you insist on a word, brought explicitly into question, being used with some particular meaning. Now, maybe as a matter of policy, you want to make a case for language like 'alt-right' being used a certain way. Well, that's a separate debate then. But you're not making a stand for Truth in doing so, and your opponents aren't tricking anyone or trying to."
+
+How would you begin to respond to this? That's not a rhetorical question: I'm actually curious.
+
+My model of Sequences-era 2009!Eliezer says, "This is an attempt to sneak in connotations by performing a categorization and trying to avoid the burden of having to justify it with an appeal-to-arbitrariness conversation-halter. Go read 'A Human's Guide to Words,' and if you've already read it, then you're being incredibly intellectually dishonest and not worth my time to interact with."
+
+But I have no idea what 2019!Eliezer says.
+
+You wrote to me on 28 November:
+
+ The notion of a lie is as sancrosanct as the notion of a truth, and you do not get to say 'lie' when somebody is doing something that you think might tempt somebody to add on a lie as an additional act. [...] 'Lying' is for per se direct falsehoods.
+
+What direct falsehood is being asserted by Scott's detractors? I don't think anyone is claiming that, say, Scott identifies as alt-right (not even privately), any more than anyone is claiming that trans women have two X chromosomes. Sneer Club has been pretty explicit in their criticism (examples: 1 2) that the Culture War thread harbors racists (&c.) and possibly that Scott himself is a secret racist, with respect to a definition of racism that includes the belief that there are genetically-mediated population differences in the distribution of socially-relevant traits and that this probably has decision-relevant consequences should be discussable somewhere.
+
+And this is just correct: e.g., "The Atomic Bomb Considered As Hungarian High School Science Fair Project" favorably cites Cochran et al.'s genetic theory of Ashkenazi achievement as "really compelling." Scott is almost certainly "guilty" of the category-membership that the speech against him is meant to convey—it's just that Sneer Club got to choose the category. The correct response to the existence of a machine-learning classifer that returns positive on both Scott Alexander and Richard Spencer is not that the classifier is "lying" (what would that even mean?), but that the classifier is not very useful for understanding Scott Alexander's effects on the world.
+
+Of course, Scott is great and we should defend him from the bastards trying to ruin his reputation, and it's plausible that the most politically convenient way to do that is to pound the table and call them lying sociopaths rather than engaging with the substance of their claims, much as how someone being tried under an unjust law might dishonestly plead "Not guilty" to save their own skin rather than tell the whole truth and hope for jury nullification.
+
+But political convenience comes at a dire cost to our common interest! There's a proverb you once failed to Google, which runs something like, "Once someone is known to be a liar, you might as well listen to the whistling of the wind."
+
+Similarly, once someone is known to vary the epistemic standards of their public statements for political convenience (even if their private, unshared thoughts continue to be consistently wise)—if they say categorizations can be lies when that happens to help their friends, but seemingly deny the possibility of categorizations being lies when that happens to make them look good ...
+
+Well, you're still somewhat better off listening to them than the whistling of the wind, because the wind in various possible worlds is presumably uncorrelated with most of the things you want to know about, whereas clever arguers who don't tell explicit lies are very constrained in how much they can mislead you. But it seems plausible that you might as well listen to any other arbitrary smart person with a blue check and 20K followers. I remain,
+
+> >
+>
+> If the statement "Pronouns aren't lies" has the same type of misapprehension-forming impact on the listener as "Scott Alexander is a racist" or "Slate Star Codex is an alt-right blog" then
+
+Wait! That's not the analogy I'm trying to make!
+
+What I'm trying to say is, whether "You're not standing in defense of truth if you insist on a word, brought explicitly into question, being used with some particular meaning" makes sense as a response to "X isn't a Y" shouldn't depend on the specific values of X and Y.
+
+Your behavior the other month made it look like you think that "You're not standing in defense of truth if ..." is a valid response when, say, X = "Caitlyn Jenner" and Y = "woman."
+
+I'm saying that whether or not it's a valid response, we should, as a matter of local validity, apply the same standard when X = "Scott Alexander" and Y = "racist."
+
+The preceding three paragraphs are glossing over some details, and I totally understand if you want to disagree with the exact way I've formulated them! (Like, maybe you think it's inappropriate that I'm focusing on category-membership even though your explicit statement was about pronouns. It's important to notice that! We may be living in different mental universes with respect to how Gricean implicature works!)
+
+But ... I'm not claiming that Eliezer's statement that "Pronouns aren't lies" has the same type of misapprehension-forming impact on the listener as Sneer Club's statement that "Scott Alexander is a racist." That's just not what the analogy was trying to do!
+
+
+But like, does anyone understand what the fuck could possibly be going on in Eliezer's head? I've spent thousands of words with lots of direct links and quotes to his own writings from ten years ago trying to explain that there's a problem where people who call themselves "rationalists" are somehow very intent on playing clever definition-hacking mind games to make it artificially expensive to express the idea that humans cannot change sex (given current technology), and that I think he could fix the problem because people might listen to him when they don't listen to me. I agree that trans issues aren't important, but I also think that if you're doing systematically correct reasoning, you should get the right answer even when the issue isn't important.
+
+I think I've been pretty explicit! And today Eliezer is chastising me and Ben for not having enough empathy to realize that people live in different mental universes. And like—I agree that people live in different mental universes! But—that seems bizarrely nonresponsive to the thousands of words I wrote explaining the problem! You see it, right?! What is there left for me to say?
+
+Michael—
+> I think that if Zack is having difficulties it would be ideal if we could move this ahead without him. Needless to say, he doesn't need to feel any responsibility and has done all that could be asked of him and more to cause this project to survive unanticipated difficulties. Right now, I don't think there's much help he can offer except for periodic pushes, like the current one, for the rest of us to keep at it.
+
+
+
+> On my model, it's good to send this because there are two possibilities
+> 1) that this demonstrates the independence of our perspectives, which causes them to count as additional evidence for a proposition, and that means that this makes us more convincing
+> 2) that this shows a lack of unity, a failure to present a United Front, which is bad, because Arguments are Soldiers, and thus we are making ourselves less convincing.
+> In the latter case, Eliezer is dead to us and it would probably help if we were to bury something in a funeral. In the former case, our friends are still in there, and the way to reach them isn't by balancing the social forces arrayed against them.
+
+I'm pretty sure I can directly link to Ozy and Kelsey speaking favorably of literal self-identity, not gating on hormones or social passability. And just ... I keep rereading this stuff trying to check that I'm not misreading, because I can't take it seriously. They're just fucking with me, right???? I don't harbor ill will against any individual people, but I just can't share a rationalist community with this level of mindfuckery.
+
+I mean, okay, if that's what you want to do. (If the outcome of these hopefully-not-too-annoying emails is that Eliezer Yudkowsky feels more social/political constraints on what he can say rather than less, then this horribly backfired and you should forget we said anything.)
+
+"How would you feel if someone else tried to get away with the 'hill of meaning in defense of validity' appeal-to-arbitrariness conversation-halter against you when you were trying to use language to reason about something you actually cared about (like defending Scott, who is great)? If it would be logically rude in that context, maybe it was also logically rude the first time?"
+
+Michael
+> We have all been essentially trained to believe that we are not entitled to voice our complaints. When someone backs off, we are prone to loosing confidence and to think that maybe we shouldn't be talking with them, yet function institutions have existed in the past, and if people aren't adhering to the normal of functional institutions, we have to not allow that to cause us to stop adhering to those norms. Therefore, we should keep doubling down with reminders regarding the rules for discussion. If he decides to not play, we should establish that to ourselves with no plausible deniability and move on.
+
+
+ "An alternative categorization system is not an error", like all appeals-to-arbitrariness, is necessarily what you called a symmetric weapon: the same form of argument works just as well for being mean to our friends as it does for being nice to our friends. The best the good guys can hope for is to win by coincidence. (Assuming there's any way to distinguish who the "good guys" are, if alternative systems that draw the "good guys" category boundary differently aren't in error, assuming there's any way to distinguish what "winning" is, if alternative systems that draw the "winning" category boundary differently aren't in error, &c.)
+
+If someone showed up at a Less Wrong meetup claiming that they had an invisible dragon, I would expect ordinary meetup attendees to exert social pushback against the dragon-claimant: "Dude, that doesn't make sense. Beliefs need to be falsifiable! You should read the Sequences!" I would even expect the social pushback to be strong enough such that the claimant would eventually either internalize the "Beliefs need to be falsifiable" idea or get the fuck out of my rationalist community.
+
+If I show up at a Less Wrong meetup claiming that people don't have invisible genders, and I get social pushback ... then I'm not really sure what my options are other than writing off the entire community.
+
+
+
+I'm not extremely troubled by my minor disagreements with you. All the actually-smart high-status old-timers I've talked to (you, Eliezer, Anna, Michael Vassar, Sarah Constantin, Ben Hoffman, Steve Rayhawk, &c.) clearly see the hidden-Bayesian-structure-of-language-and-cognition thing I'm trying to point at. Even if you say it's mere awkwardness and not a serious epistemology problem, at least you acknowledge the awkwardness, which is more than I've gotten out of Kelsey.
+
+The thing I find extremely troubling is that none of the old-timers who clearly understand the thing are willing to say so loudly and in public where other people can learn from it, with the exceptions of Ben and Vassar—and Vassar's in-community status is getting debased. (Sarah drafted a post supporting me on the categories thing, but decided not to publish it.)
+
+You wrote about the "inevitable" forces pointing towards a future guided by the beauty of our weapons, where good arguments eventually win out over bad arguments. What if you were too optimistic? What if good arguments don't win—not even in the so-called "rationalist" community?
+
+I think "Categories should carve reality at the joints to help us make efficient probabilistic predictions" is a better argument than "Categories capture tradeoffs you care about; they don't have to carve reality at the joints if that makes people sad." Right now, the better argument is losing. Unless something changes, the better argument will continue to lose. In other words, we live in a world where reason doesn't work. If we live in a world where reason doesn't work, then we're dead. If we can't get consensus on easy problems (Q: Can men become women by means of saying so? A: No. Why would you think that?), then how are we supposed to solve AI alignment?
+
+
+
+> I don't know if you read the glowfic that Alicorn and Kelsey write. There was a scene in one of their LoTR things where some elves capture some orcs. They learn that the orcs are nice people deep down, evil god Melkor has forced the orcs to swear an oath to serve him and do evil all the time and kill people. And for complicated magic reasons, orcs cannot break oaths, or else they are tormented by unbearable pain. So even though the orcs are nice, they are compelled to serve Melkor, who usually wants them to kill people and stuff.
+
+> After a while, our hero comes up with a solution. She founds a religion on the spot devoted to a Deist-style omnipotent observer God, who just so happens to also be named Melkor. Deist-Melkor just wants people to live their lives and be happy and help others. She claims that the orcs did swear an oath to follow Melkor, but they didn't specify *which* Melkor, and since her Melkor is omnipotent he takes preference over evil-Melkor. The orcs (who are all kind of dumb, and also incentivized toward highly motivated reasoning) agree this makes sense, this seems to satisfy whatever magic enforces their oath, and so they go off and live their lives and be happy and help others.
+
+> Part of this story is that occasionally some people will approach the orcs and be like "This is kind of dumb, right, on some level you know you're supposed to be following evil Melkor", and this information is infohazardous to orcs and can put them in unbearable pain (or compel them to kill people and stuff) until they're able to talk themselves out of it.
+
+> I asked Alicorn whether this was an intentional metaphor for this discussion, since I know you've been talking to her about it. She says no. But it captures a lot of how I think about this. Are the *real rationalists!!!* the ones who go to the orcs and tell them that they obviously meant to serve evil Melkor and so should be in constant pain all the time? Are those the people who are """winning"""? Or would saying that just be pointlessly harming them for no reason?
+
+> I couldn't care less about transgender.
+
+Michael—
+> I agree that he isn't, but it seems Important to me that if we think he isn't interested we actually establish common knowledge that we consider him at this point to be choosing to try to be a cult leader.
+
+
+I was kind of considering replying, "That's totally understandable! Would a financial incentive change your decision? For a two-hour meeting, I'd be happy to pay up to $4000 to you or your preferred charity. If you don't want the money, then sure, yes, let's table this. I hope you're having a good day."
+
+But, maybe I shouldn't do this because the "Volunteer to throw four-figure amounts of money at people in order to get them to hear me out" move is simultaneously personally degrading, psychologically coercive, extremely socially weird, and bad for my economic self-interest.
+
+https://meltingasphalt.com/tears/
+
+commit a5316c23ac837c004922e2d192c2bea914a21ebc
+Author: Zack M. Davis <zack@thecoalition.com>
+Date: Tue Mar 19 00:27:53 2019 -0700
+
+ DIS-327: broker-facing duplicate-quote route
+
+ It's sharing code with the internal resïssue-quote endpoint, because
+ that's convenient.
+
+
+
+
+Scott, like, you sent me that email piously arguing that it's OK to gerrymander category boundaries because it's important for trans people's mental health. And there's a couple things that I don't understand.
+
+(1) If creatively reinterpreting the meanings of words because the natural interpretation would make people sad is OK ... why doesn't that just generalize to an argument in favor of outright lying when the truth would make people sad? I don't understand why semantic mind games are OK, but lying is wrong. (Compare: "If you’re going to ignore a probabilistic counterargument, why not ignore a proof, too?") From my perspective the motte-and-bailey definition-hacking mind games are far more cruel than a simple lie. Speaking of which----
+
+(2) If "mental health benefits for trans people" matter so much, then, like, why doesn't my mental health matter? Aren't I trans, sort of? Like, what do I have to do in order to qualify, was my being on hormones for only 5 months not good enough? Or do I have to be part of the political coalition in order for my feelings to count? We had an entire Sequence whose specific moral was that words can be wrong. And of the 37 Ways that Words Can Be Wrong, number 30 is "Your definition draws a boundary around things that don't really belong together," and number 31 is, "You use a short word for something that you won't need to describe often, or a long word for something you'll need to describe often." And this is the thing I've been trying to tell everyone about. And when I try to talk to you about it, you're like, "Doesn't matter, mental health benefits for trans people are more important according to the utilitarian calculus! Also, you're wrong." And like ... getting shut down by appeal-to-utilitarianism (!?!?) when I'm trying to use reason to make sense of the world is observably really bad for my mental health! Does that matter at all? Also, if I'm philosophically wrong, then Eliezer was wrong in 2009, because everything I'm doing now, I learned from him. Do you really think "c'mon, parsimony doesn't matter" is an improvement on the Sequences?!
+
+(3) You write, "wouldn't it be embarrassing if the community solved Friendly AI and went down in history as the people who created Utopia forever, and you had rejected it because of gender stuff?"
+
+But the original reason it seemed plausible that we would create Utopia forever wasn't "because we're us", it was because we were trying to do systematically correct reasoning, with the hope of using the systematically correct reasoning to build aligned superintelligence. If we're not going to do systematically correct reasoning because that would make people sad, then that undermines the reason that it was plausible that we would create Utopia forever. You can't just forfeit the mandate of Heaven like that and still expect to still rule China.
+
+(4) You write, "I realize you are probably thinking something like 'This isn't just me getting triggered by some culture war thing evolved to trigger me, it actually really *is* that important that rationalists get transgender right!' [...] All I can say is that I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken."
+
+I don't know how much social proof influences you, but is the fact that I managed to round up Michael and Ben and Sarah and [name redacted] into a coalition to help me argue with Eliezer shift your estimate at all of whether my concerns have some objective merit? It can simultaneously be the case that I have the culture-war PTSD that you propose, and that my concerns have merit.
+
+(5) I don't know how other people's confidentiality intuitions work. Am I being an asshole by cc'ing in my coalition members (plus Anna, who is my friend even though she hasn't been helping me with this particular quest) in an email that references things you said in an email that was addressed only to me? I think this should be OK; I don't think we're talking about anything particularly secret.
+
+----
+
+
+I'm really sorry about this. I don't need Scott's help and I think Michael is being a little aggressive about that, but I guess that's also kind of Michael's style? I'm really sorry, because I still think that even very emotionally disturbed people are clearly incentivizable, and so the narrative of, "Oh, poor Zack, he's crazy, he can't help it" is not attributing me enough agency. Like, if I get really upset literally once every two years and impose a lot of care costs on other people in the process, I should be held accountable for that somehow. Last time, I ended up giving people some money (I didn't end up doing the public-praise part that I proposed in the blog post about it, because it turned out that that would have been too socially weird) but I don't know if even the money was a good social experiment or not.
+
+> No.
+> We don't have punishment.
+> We don't have morality.
+> I'm trying to change that and you are undermining the attempt!
+> We won't be friends.
+> We're not friends anymore already! Once again, I am trying to change that and you are making it impossible.
+In terms of making intellectual progress, I'm still most excited about the idea I was talking myself into all day in the "strategy huddle II" thread (I'll forward that to Jessica): "If Scott and Eliezer don't want to talk, whatever, I can just write those guys off (why did I think they were so important anyway?) and just focus on writing up the mathematically rigorous version of the thing I'm trying to say about how categories can be value-dependent because your values determine which dimensions you pay attention to (like 'birds' vs. 'flying things'), but that's really different from 'people will be sad if I use this category', and we should be able to demonstrate mathematically that the 'people will be sad if I think this' categories are less useful for making inferences. Not only will I learn lots of stuff in the process of figuring out the details, but when it's finished, our coalition can hype it up as interesting new 'Human's Guide to Words'-like content, and then at least the mathy people in our alleged community will see the parsimonious-categories-are-important thing in a context where the math will convince them and politics won't distract them."
+
+So ... I really should have just stuck to that plan and not freaked out: forget this stupid "appeal to local celebrities" game and just do cool math for two months. But when it was 4 a.m. (because I'd been obsessing all day, and I really wanted to meet my manager's deadline for the code that we want for our business, and I did write some code intermittently between 11 p.m. and 4 a.m.), I was just really upset at the whole situation, and I sent some more hasty emails, I think because at some psychological level I wanted Scott to know, "I'm so frustrated about your use of 'mental health for trans people' as an Absolute Denial Macro that I'm losing sleep over it even though we know sleep is really important for me." But then when Michael started advocating on my behalf (Michael seems to have a theory that people will only change their bad behavior when they see a victim who is being harmed), I started to minimize my claims because I have a generalized attitude of not wanting to portray/sell myself as a victim, even if it is technically literally true that I'm really hurt in a way that is causally related to other people behaving in ways that are bad. And I feel really guilty and wanting-to-appease about disappointing Michael (who has done so much for me), even though I know that Michael doesn't want me to care about disappointing him in particular, because I should just care about doing the Right Thing. I think that Michael thinks that aggression is more honest than passive-aggression. I think that's obviously true, but I just can't be too aggressive to my friends and people I admire (e.g., Anna, Scott, Eliezer). I just won't do it. I can passively let my metaphorical lawyers like Ben do it while accurately claiming to represent my interests, but I won't do it myself because I'm scared of damaging relationships. (Or offending people I worship as demigods.)
+
+So, I don't know. I think having been on the edge of a bad outcome but stepping away (I got 2ish hours worth of napping; I'll be just fine) will help me move on, and dissolve my unhealthy attachment to the "rationalist" brand name/social identity? (At the meeting on Sunday, it was pointed out that forging a new brand-name/Schelling-point-for-interesting-people-to-gather is easier than recapturing an old one.) I just ... we had a whole Sequence specifically about how you can't define a word any way you want, because you need words to map to the statistical structure in the world. I keep trying to point out, "Look, isn't that inconsistent with this newly fashionable 'categories were made for man'/'hill of meaning in defense of validity' moral? Right? Right? You have to see it? It can't possibly just be me who sees it?!" and Scott and Eliezer seem to keep rounding me off to, "Zack is upset about trans stuff which doesn't matter" even though I keep explicitly disclaiming that (while it's true that I'm upset about trans stuff that doesn't matter), that's not the part I expect them to care about. And I've just been really freaking out for three and a half months on end, because I learned everything I know from Eliezer, and the other half of everything I know from Scott, and like ... they can't really be that stupid, right? They have to just be fucking with me, right??
+
+That's really unhealthy. (We were warned that it's unhealthy: "nervously seeking reassurance is not the best frame of mind in which to evaluate questions of rationality".)
+
+The tension between "I don't want to do too much social aggression" and "losing the Category War within the rationalist community is absolutely unacceptable; if I have to do social aggression and lose friends and burn bridges if there's any hope of getting people to see the hidden-Bayesian-structure-of-language-and-cognition thing again, then I'll do it" has been causing me a lot of pain and making me make wildly inconsistent decisions. (Emailing Scott at 4 a.m., and then calling Michael "aggressive" when he came to defend me is just crazy.)
+
+If there isn't actually any such thing in the world as a "rationalist community" (it's just a category boundary in my head that I keep attaching importance to, even though Sarah clearly explained to my why this is dumb two years ago, and I just haven't made the corresponding mental adjustments), then maybe losing the Category War within it is acceptable? Maybe that's the answer? If so, I wish I had been able to find the answer without leaving so much of a mess.
+
+Wait, maybe there is a reason to be attached to the "rationalist" brand name/social identity that isn't just me being stupid, and if we can find what the non-stupid reason is, then we can make better decisions.
+
+I think a non-stupid reason is that the way I talk has actually been trained really hard on this subculture for ten years: most of my emails during this whole campaign have contained multiple Sequences or Slate Star Codex links that I can just expect people to have read. I can spontaneously use the phrase "Absolute Denial Macro" in conversation and expect to be understood. That's a massive "home field advantage." If I just give up on "rationalists" being as sane as we were in 2009 (when we knew that men can't become women by means of saying so), and go out in the world to make intellectual friends elsewhere (by making friends with Quillette readers or arbitrary University of Chicago graduates), then I lose all that accumulated capital. The language I speak is mostly educated American English, but I rely on subculture dialect for a lot. My sister has a chemistry doctorate from MIT (so speaks the language of STEM intellectuals generally), and when I showed her "... To Make Predictions", she reported finding it somewhat hard to read, probably because I casually use phrases like "thus, an excellent motte", and expect to be understood without the reader taking 10 minutes to read the link. This essay, which was me writing from the heart in the words that came most naturally to me, could not be published in Quillette. The links and phraseology are just too context-bound.
+
+Maybe that's why I feel like I have to stand my ground and fight a culture war (even though I really don't want to be socially aggressive, and the contradiction between the war effort and my general submissiveness makes me make crazy decisions).
+
+I feel like I have to be careful phrasing my complaints about Berkeley culture, because if I'm not super-careful, people will round me off as saying, "Help! Censorship! I'm being repressed!" and then counterargue that I'm observably not being censored (which is true, modulo Ben's concerns about distributed silencing, which I feel motivated to downplay because I don't want to sell myself as a victim). The problem is much subtler than that. Berkeley "rationalists" are very good at free speech norms and deserve credit for that! But it still feels like a liberal church where you can say "I believe in evolution" without getting socially punished. Like, it's good that you can do that. But I had a sense that more is possible: a place where you can not just not-get-punished for being an evolutionist, but a place where you can say, "Wait! Given all this evidence for natural selection as the origin of design in the biological world, we don't need this 'God' hypothesis anymore. And now that we know that, we can work out whatever psychological needs we were trying to fulfil with this 'church' organization, and use that knowledge to design something that does an even better job at fulfilling those needs!" and have everyone just get it, at least on the meta level.
+
+I can accept a church community that disagrees on whether evolution is true. (Er, on the terms of this allegory.) I can accept a church community that disagrees on what the implications are conditional on the hypothesis that evolution is true. I cannot accept a church in which the canonical response to "Evolution is true! God isn't real!" is "Well, it depends on how you choose to draw the 'God' category boundary." I mean, I agree that words can be used in many ways, and that the answer to questions about God does depend on how the asker and answerer are choosing to draw the category boundary corresponding to the English language word 'God'. That observation can legitimately be part of the counterargument to "God isn't real!" But if the entire counterargument is just, "Well, it depends on how you define the word 'God', and a lot of people would be very sad if we defined 'God' in a way such that it turned out to not exist" ... unacceptable! Absolutely unacceptable! If this is the peak of publicly acceptable intellectual discourse in Berkeley, CA, and our AI alignment research group is based out of Berkeley (where they will inevitably be shaped by the local culture), and we can't even notice that there is a problem, then we're dead! We're just fucking dead! Right? Right?? I can't be the only one who sees this, am I? What is Toronto??????
+
+Ben—
+> Just wrote to Scott explicitly asking him to alter the beacon so that people like Zack don't think that's the place to go for literally doing the thing anymore, and ideally to redirect them to us (but that's a stretch). If he actually does this, that would be a really good time to start the new group blog.
+
+> This seems like the sort of thing where it's actually in his local interest to help us, as it reduces our incentive to ask him to do hard things.
+
+
+Michael—
+> This all seems sound, but also not worth the digression. Zack, do you feel comfortable with generalizing the sort of things that Scott said, and the things that others here have said about fear of talking openly, and assuming that something similar is probably happening with Eliezer too?
+
+> If so, now that we have common knowledge, there is really no point in letting technical quibbles distract us. We need to deal with the actual crisis, which is that dread is tearing apart old friendships and causing fanatics to betray everything that they ever stood for while it's existence is still being denied.
+
+
+He said that he wasn't sure why the grand moral of "A Human's Guide to Words" was "You can't define a word any way you want" rather than "You can define a word any way you want, but then you have to deal with the consequences."
+
+Ultimately, I think this is a pedagogy decision that Eliezer got right. If you write your summary slogan in relativist language, people predictably take that as license to believe whatever they want without having to defend it. Whereas if you write your summary slogan in objectivist language—so that people know they don't have social permission to say that "it's subjective so I can't be wrong"—then you have some hope of sparking a useful discussion about the exact, precise ways that specific, definite things are, in fact, relative to other specific, definite things.
+
+
+You texted last week, "Am I agitating you in a manner that isn't a good idea? If so, please tell me."
+
+I'm tempted to speculate that I might be better at taking your feedback about how to behave reasonably rather than doing the "cowering and submission to whoever I'm currently most afraid of losing relationship-points with" thing, if you try to be gentler sometimes, hopefully without sacrificing clarity? (Concrete examples: statements like, "What the FUCK Zack!?!" are really hard on me, and I similarly took "We're not friends anymore already!" badly at the time because I was reading it as you damning me, but that one is mostly my poor reading comprehension under sleep deprivation, because in context you were almost certainly responding to my "everyone will still be friends" babbling.)
+
+But, if you think that gentleness actually sacrifices clarity in practice, then I guess I could just do a better job of sucking it up.
projects / Ultimately_Untrue_Thought.git / blobdiff