I can think of two reasons why the naïve objection might fail. (And who can say but that a neutral expert witness on decision theory wouldn't think of more?)
-First, the true decision theory is subtler than "defy anything that you can commonsensically pattern-match as looking like 'extortion'"; the case for resisting extortion specifically rests on there existing a subjunctive dependence between your decision and the extortionist's decision (they threaten _because_ you'll give in, or won't bother _because_ you won't), and the relevant subjunctive dependence doesn't obviously pertain in the real-life science intellectual _vs._ social justice mob match-up. If the mob has been trained from past experience to predict that their targets will give in, should you defy them now in order to somehow make your current situation "less real"? Depending on the correct theory of logical counterfactuals, the right stance might be ["We don't negotiate with terrorists, but we do appease bears"](/2019/Dec/political-science-epigrams/) (because the bear's response isn't calculated based on our response), and the forces of political orthodoxy might be relevantly bear-like.
+First, the true decision theory is subtler than "defy anything that you can commonsensically pattern-match as looking like 'extortion'"; the case for resisting extortion specifically rests on there existing a subjunctive dependence between your decision and the extortionist's decision (they threaten _because_ you'll give in, or don't bother _because_ you won't), and the relevant subjunctive dependence doesn't obviously pertain in the real-life science intellectual _vs._ social justice mob match-up. If the mob has been trained from past experience to predict that their targets will give in, should you defy them now in order to somehow make your current situation "less real"?[^emerson] Depending on the correct theory of logical counterfactuals, the right stance might be ["We don't negotiate with terrorists, but we do appease bears"](/2019/Dec/political-science-epigrams/) (because the bear's response isn't calculated based on our response), and the forces of political orthodoxy might be relevantly bear-like.
-On the other hand, the relevant subjunctive dependence doesn't obviously _not_ pertain, either! Parsing social justice as an agentic "threat" rather than a non-agentic obstacle like an avalanche, does seem to line up with the fact that people punish heretics, who dissent from an ideological group, more than infidels, who were never part of the group to begin with—_because_ heretics are more extortable—more vulnerable to social punishment from the original group.
+[^emerson]: I remember back in 'aught-nine, Tyler Emerson was caught embezzling funds from the Singularity Institute, and SingInst made a point of prosecuting him on decision-theoretic grounds, when a lot of other nonprofits would have quietly covered it up to spare themselves the embarrassment.
-Which brings me to the second reason the naïve anti-extortion argument might fail: what counts as "extortion" depends on the relevant "property rights", what the "default" action is. If having free speech is the default, being excluded from the coalition for defying the orthodoxy could be construed as extortion. But if _being excluded from the coalition_ is the default, maybe toeing the line of orthodoxy is the price you need to pay in order to be included.
+On the other hand, the relevant subjunctive dependence doesn't obviously _not_ pertain, either! Parsing social justice as an agentic "threat" rather than a non-agentic obstacle like an avalanche, does seem to line up with the fact that people punish heretics (who dissent from an ideological group) more than infidels (who were never part of the group to begin with), _because_ heretics are more extortable—more vulnerable to social punishment from the original group.
+
+Which brings me to the second reason the naïve anti-extortion argument might fail: [what counts as "extortion" depends on the relevant "property rights", what the "default" action is](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Qjaaux3XnLBwomuNK/countess-and-baron-attempt-to-define-blackmail-fail). If having free speech is the default, being excluded from the coalition for defying the orthodoxy could be construed as extortion. But if _being excluded from the coalition_ is the default, maybe toeing the line of orthodoxy is the price you need to pay in order to be included.
[TODO: defying threats, cont'd—
- * Yudkowsky does seemingly back commonsensical interpretations, re voting, or how, back in 'aught-nine, SingInst had made a point of prosecuting Tyler Emerson, citing decision theory
+ * Yudkowsky has an algorithm for bargaining between agents with different notions of "fairness": you'd prefer a fair split on the Pareto boundary, but you should be willing to except an unfair split, as long as the other guy also does worse—all the way to the Nash equilibrium https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/z2YwmzuT7nWx62Kfh/cooperating-with-agents-with-different-ideas-of-fairness
+ * How does this map on to the present situation, though? Does he think he's playing Nash, or does he think he's getting gains-from-trade? (Either figure this out, or write some smart sentences about my confusion)
+
+ * I asked him why he changed his mind about voting
+ * "Vote when you're part of a decision-theoretic logical cohort large enough to change things, or when you're worried about your reputation and want to be honest about whether you voted."
+ * So maybe he doesn't think he's part of a decision-theoretic logical cohort large enough to resist the egregore, and he's also not worried about his reputation for resisting the egregore
+ * If his reptuation in the eyes of people like me just isn't that valuable, I guess I can't argue with that
+
+Curtis Yarvin [likes to compare](/2020/Aug/yarvin-on-less-wrong/) Yudkowsky to [Sabbatai Zevi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabbatai_Zevi#Conversion_to_Islam), the Jewish religious leader who was purported to be the Messiah, who converted to Islam under coercion from the Ottomans. "I know, without a shadow of a doubt, that in the same position, Eliezer Yudkowsky would also convert to Islam," said Yarvin.
- * Curtis Yarvin has compared Yudkowsky to Sabbatai Zevi (/2020/Aug/yarvin-on-less-wrong/), and I've got to say the comparison is dead-on. Sabbatai Zevi was facing much harsher coercion: his choices were to convert to Islam or be impaled https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabbatai_Zevi#Conversion_to_Islam
+ * But this isn't necessarily crazy. Zevi was facing some very harsh coercion: convert or be impaled.
+ * My real question is, in the same position, would Sabbatai Zevi declare that 30% of the ones with penises are actually women?
]
projects / Ultimately_Untrue_Thought.git / commitdiff