- * You could imagine him mocking me for trying to reason this out, instead of just using honor. "That's right, I'm appealing to your honor, goddamn it!"
+[^gambit]: In _ways that exhibit generally rationalist principles_, natch.
+
+I can think of two reasons why the naïve objection might fail. (And who can say but that a neutral expert witness on decision theory wouldn't think of more?)
+
+First, the true decision theory is subtler than "defy anything that you can commonsensically pattern-match as looking like 'extortion'"; the case for resisting extortion specifically rests on there existing a subjunctive dependence between your decision and the extortionist's decision (they threaten _because_ you'll give in, or don't bother _because_ you won't), and the relevant subjunctive dependence doesn't obviously pertain in the real-life science intellectual _vs._ social justice mob match-up. If the mob has been trained from past experience to predict that their targets will give in, should you defy them now in order to somehow make your current situation "less real"? Depending on the correct theory of logical counterfactuals, the correct stance might be ["We don't negotiate with terrorists, but we do appease bears"](/2019/Dec/political-science-epigrams/) (because the bear's response isn't calculated based on our response), and the progressive egregore might be relevantly bear-like.
+
+On the other hand, the relevant subjunctive dependence doesn't obviously _not_ pertain, either!
+
+[TODO: defying threats, cont'd—