memoir: fill text through initial posse formation

[Ultimately_Untrue_Thought.git] / notes / a-hill-email-review.md

Email timeline—
1 Dec 2018: "super-presumptuous mail about categorization and the influence graph" to Scott cc Anna Jonah Sarah Michael
... discussion with Scott runs to 3 Dec
3 Dec: forward Scott thread to Ben and Katie, privacy leak
4 Dec: Ben—bullshit nitpicking is an implied ostracism threat
5 Dec: Ben—the interesting part is your model of the "rationalists" is wrong
6 Dec: Michael—this is important, share with Aurora?
10 Dec: asking Anna for her take
11 Dec: social proof from Sarah to Scott
11 Dec: Michael—argument should be compelling unless Craft Is Not the Community
12 Dec: emailing Harmanas after running into him at the train
16 Dec: to Sarah and Michael, "I still owe you" first draft
16 Dec: Michael—I want EY to respond to arguments, but wait a few weeks?
18–19 Dec: to Anna and Michael, on conversational violence and self-defense
19 Dec: met Aurora
21 Dec: to Sarah, something to protect
21 Dec: Sarah—Let's Get This Gender Thing Over With (unpublished)
24 Dec: ... further discussion with Ben/Sarah/Michael
26 Dec: my intelligence notes on Ziz
30 Dec: Ben—phatic declaration of respect makes me feel less safe
1 Jan: final draft of "I still owe you money"
1 Jan: Eliezer has taken initiative to spend Eliezerself's time, Rob as police
3 Jan: meatspace met with Michael/Sarah/Auora/Ben/Andrew
5 Jan: met with Ziz and Gwen with Michael and Aurora, lawsuits 
6 Jan: backchannel to Anna about Ziz
6 Jan: EY thread cont'd
9 Jan: I want to see you be brave (was: Re: I still owe you money; and, discourse on categories and the fourth virtue)
11 Jan: me—What do think submitting to social pressure looks like?!
15 Jan: unsent "thunder comes before gaslighting" draft
16 Jan: Ben to me/Anna on old thread: esotericism is less of a problem if flagged
18 Jan: gender refugees, moral patiency, and BBL
29 Jan: me to Kay Brown: have you noticed LGBTQ/queer culture getting worse?
8 Feb: me to Katie about Rust All-Hands
8 Feb: me to Ben and Michael about social competence
20 Feb: impulsive email to Scott (subject: a howl of despair which is nameless)
20 Feb: cold outreach to Ben Landau-Taylor
21 Feb: telling Marcus, I'm out of cards: we created a monster
22 Feb: "RIP Culture War" thread
22 Feb: Michael offers advice; I forward with Scott; Michael calls it a destructive move
25 Feb: first draft of defending against "alt-right" categorization
27 Feb: more support from the gang
27-28 Feb: on private universes
1 Mar: intra-group disagreement re "ambient epistemic violence"
2 Mar: Michael—independence of perspectives vs. failure to present an united front
2 Mar: I saw the new Rebel Wilson movie last night, went to Simon's birthday (I remember seeing Scott there), then met Anna
2 Mar: Anna's comment about Michael
3 Mar: "Apologies are always intrinsically worthless, but that fact that we are able to legitimately demand an apology means that we can legitimately demand that he look at something."
3 Mar: I heard Anna say my desire for good arugments to win was "selfish"; what she actually said was "self-centered", "it seems less important than what happens on topics that we don't all know there isn't free speech about."
3 Mar: "told them that the thing that would most help AI risk from them anyhow was for them to continue on their present career," is that if I try to only focus on "important" things, I'll probably just come up with something fake
3 Mar: more draft, more thanks for social proof
5 Mar: Scott gets back to me
5 Mar: 12 short stories about language (and, expressing regret that I only email Scott when I need something from him)
6 Mar: SJWs without guns doing this than you are about mostly white men with money, gavels and guns doing it? ...  SJW agenda is to play by the same rules as the legal system plays by, and they do it with less support from tradition and from ritual, so it's more obvious,
6 Mar: much better draft to EY (defending against alt-right)
10 Mar: send revised draft to EY
14 Mar: meeting with Ben/Sarah/Marie/Jessica; Ben assist on "Blegg Mode"
17 Mar: me to Scott, bringing up idea that in-person ideas were better
17 Mar: Michael characterizing EY as choosing to be a cult leader
18 Mar: starting to overheat (subject: "strategy huddle II")—
I referred to Sarah and Ben at Sunday conversation saying in-person meetings were better
Scott says "I try to avoid in-person meetings in general, and this is probably in my bottom 1% of things that I would enjoy talking about in person"
I write to my team wondering if I should propose a $4000 happy price
then I say, maybe don't reply before Friday
6 p.m.: really angry at Scott for not understanding the difference between cluster in a value-dependent subspace (as with the dagim/fish example), and value-dependent to not make my friends sad. But my boss was expecting code by noon tomorrow
7 p.m.: let go of the anger somehow and just do my job this week and then write up the mathy version
8:44 p.m.: fantasizing about recruiting Buck or Duncan to our coalition; never sure how to interpret my self-reports; even when crying, shaking, randomly yelling, &c. I think I'm still noticeably incentivizable: I think that if someone were to present a credible threat (e.g., slapping me and telling me to snap out of it), then I would be able to calm down: there's some sort of game-theory algorithm in the brain that subjectively feels genuine distress (like crying or sending people too many hysterical emails) but only when it can predict that it will be tolerated
10:27 p.m.: I tweeted a Sequences quote that summarizes how I'm feeling (mention is to attribute credit; Eliezer has so many followers that he probably won't even see the mention notification), except it's not quite appropriate, because the quote is about failure resulting in the need to invent new methods of rationality, better than the ones you were taught. But ... the methods I was taught are great! I don't have a pressing need to improve on them! I just can't cope with everyone else having forgotten!
11:01 p.m.: OK, the dayjob situation is really bad right now (it's almost 2300), so let's try one of those commitment-contract things. I hereby pledge not to check my personal email, Facebook, or Twitter until 1700 Pacific Daylight time on Friday the twenty-second of March. (I have an /etc/hosts manipulation script and I can turn off my home computer to help.) If I fail in this pledge, then ... um, I'm having trouble thinking of a good incentive here. (Traditionally you use money, but unfortunately, I'm only 78% Ashkenazi and my brain doesn't believe money is real.) So, um, "or else"!
2:47-3:55 a.m.: some replies from Michael
4:01 a.m.: I got the unit test passing; why do I keeping lying about email hiatus?
4:15 a.m.: "predictably bad ideas" email to Anna/Michael/Ben/Sarah/Zvi/Scott/Alicorn/Mike


>  When I look at the world, it looks like [Scott](http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/11/21/the-categories-were-made-for-man-not-man-for-the-categories/) and [Eliezer](https://twitter.com/ESYudkowsky/status/1067183500216811521) and [Kelsey](https://theunitofcaring.tumblr.com/post/171986501376/your-post-on-definition-of-gender-and-woman-and) and [Robby Bensinger](https://www.facebook.com/robbensinger/posts/10158073223040447?comment_id=10158073685825447&reply_comment_id=10158074093570447&comment_tracking=%7B%22tn%22%3A%22R2%22%7D) seem to think that some variation on ["I can define a word any way I want"]() is sufficient to end debates on transgender identity.

> And ... I want to be nice to my trans friends, too, but that can't possibly be the definitive end-of-conversation correct argument. Not _really_. Not if you're being serious.

> But I want to live in a rationalist community that can actually _update_—where a bad argument by a high-status person will _eventually_ be publicly known to lose to a superior counterargument, even if the person originating the counterargument is lower status and the counterargument happens to have genuinely unfavorable political implications.

> But ultimately, I've got _something to protect_. This is even more humiliating, really. It's not even a good or wholesome something to protect that you'd feel comfortable blogging about under your own name. It's actually kind of obscene. Good or not, wholesome or not, obscene or not, it's for all the boys like me who had a dream whose proper realization happens to have [_more complicated implementation details_](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/QZs4vkC7cbyjL9XA9/changing-emotions) than applying social pressure to make everyone pretend that they've coordinated to redefine a top-20 word. Those boys deserve to not be lied to.

> I've tried to be pretty explicit about only expecting buy-in for a minimal flag that says, "'I Can Define a Word Any Way I Want' can't be the end of the debate, because choosing to call things different names doesn't change the empirical cluster-structure of bodies and minds in the world; while the same word might legitimately be used with different definitions/extensions in different contexts

> I keep thinking of the part where Dagny entreats the great Dr. Robert Stadler to denounce a not-technically-lying statement by the State Science Institute

> Imagine your friends got a new front porch installed on your house, and you noticed that the boards were smoother and shinier than you expected. A question you might then ask your friend is, "Oh, is this real wood, or one of those wood-plastic composites?"

> In phrasing it that way, you're not saying that composites are bad; it's just that it makes sense to use language to asymmetrically distinguish between the natural thing that already existed, and the synthetic thing that has been deliberately engineered to resemble the original thing as much as possible.

The Craft Is Not The Community, (https://srconstantin.wordpress.com/2017/08/08/the-craft-is-not-the-community/amp/) 


Anyway, meanwhile, other conversations were happening. 





Michael—
> Ben once told me that conversation with me works like this. I try to say things that are literally true and people bend over backwards to pretend to agree but to think that I am being metaphorical.


> Yes, exactly. I'm still framing it as "appeal to the conscience of someone who built their career on higher standards" rather than appealing to a standard a court or a community could enforce. Eliezer reportedly didn't think much of Atlas Shrugged ... I assume Andrew has read it? I keep thinking of the part where Dagny entreats the great Dr. Robert Stadler to denounce a not-technically-lying statement by the State Science Institute:

> I do want to distinguish between direct ideological conformity enforcement attempts, and "people not living up to their usual epistemic standards in response to ideological conformity enforcement in the general culture." So-called "rationalists" are actually very good at not-being-persecutory! (I don't think I'd be saying this in the nearby possible world where Scott Siskind didn't have a traumatizing social-justice-shaming experience in college, but it's true here.)

You see the problem, right? I'm kind of at my wits' end here, because I thought the point of this whole "rationality" project was to carve out one place in the entire world where good arguments would eventually triumph over bad arguments, even when the good arguments happen to be mildly politically inconvenient.

appeal-to-arbitrariness conversation halter
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wqmmv6NraYv4Xoeyj/conversation-halters

(I _want_ to confidently predict that everything I've just said is completely obvious to you, because I learned it all specifically from you! A 130 IQ _nobody_ like me shouldn't have to say _any_ of this to the _author_ of "A Human's Guide to Words"! But then I don't know how to reconcile that with your recent public statement about [not seeing "how there's scientific truth at stake"](https://twitter.com/ESYudkowsky/status/1067482047126495232). Hence this desperate and [_confused_](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5JDkW4MYXit2CquLs/your-strength-as-a-rationalist) email plea.)

And I'm still really confused, because I still feel like everything I'm saying here is a trivial application of Sequences-lore. If I'm getting something wrong, I should be overjoyed to be harshly corrected by the Great Teacher! A simple person like me is as but a mere worm in the presence of the great Eliezer Yudkowsky! But if it looks like the Great Teacher is getting something wrong (wrong with respect to the balanced flow of arguments and evidence in which every "step is precise and has no room in it for your whims", although not wrong in the sense of making a factually incorrect statement) and the 



Great Teacher neither corrects me nor says "OK, you're right and I was wrong, well done, my student", what am I supposed to conclude? Is this a prank—a test? Am I like Brennan in "Initiation Ceremony", being evaluated to see if I have the guts to stand by my vision of the Way in the face of social pressure? (If so, I'm not doing a very good job, because I definitely wouldn't be writing this if I hadn't gotten social proof from Michael, Ben, and Sarah.) Did I pass??

In a functioning rationalist community, there should never be any occasion in which "appeal to Eliezer Yudkowsky's personal authority" seems like a good strategy: the way this is supposed to work is that I should just make my arguments with the understanding that good arguments will be accepted and bad arguments will be rejected. But I've been trying that, and it's mostly not working. On any other topic, I probably would have just given up and accepted the social consensus by now: "Sure, OK, whatever, trans women are women by definition; who am I to think I've seen into the Bayes-structure?" I still think this from time to time, and feel really guilty about arguing for the Bad Guys (because in my native Blue Tribe culture, only Bad people want to talk about sexual dimorphism). But then I can't stop seeing the Bayes-structure that says that biological sex continues to be a predictively-useful concept even when it's ideologically unfashionable—and I've got Something to Protect. What am I supposed to do?

I agree that this is the only reason you should care.

ut if it looks like the Great Teacher is getting something wrong (wrong with respect to the balanced flow of arguments and evidence in which every "step is precise and has no room in it for your whims", although not wrong in the sense of making a factually incorrect statement) and the Great Teacher neither corrects me nor says "OK, you're right and I was wrong, well done, my student", what am I supposed to conclude? Is this a prank—a test? Am I like Brennan in "Initiation Ceremony", being evaluated to see if I have the guts to stand by my vision of the Way in the face of social pressure? (If so, I'm not doing a very good job, because I definitely wouldn't be writing this if I hadn't gotten social proof from Michael, Ben, and Sarah.) Did I pass??

> I don't think it's as clear as that. The trans community has never been solely focused on people who believe they've always been of x gender. It's just that it's such a freeing and helpful explanation when trying to get people to accept that you in fact are of that gender. The x in a body of y explanation has always been a shortcut to get cis people to leave us alone more than a real feeling, honestly.
> And then the thread did not explode into acrimony. 

My paraphrase: "Oh, it's not actually true; it's a non-true thing that we tell cis people to get them to model us the way we want to be modeled"!?

Isn't that at least kind of like lying? (Or if these authors get to choose their preferred category boundary for "woman", do I get to choose my preferred category boundary for "lie"?)


f you want people to use your preferred categories, you're going to need to convince them with some sort of argument that those categories are predictively useful. I don't see the point of saying "There's no epistemic issue here, although maybe there's a policy debate about how to use language; end-of-discussion" if it's not to justify the mind games? Why can't we get a clear ex cathedra statement that gender categories are not an exception to the rule that categories are nonarbitrary? Isn't it true, and important, and something that people who ought to know better are getting wrong? Surely there's some way for "not alt-right" signaling to be purchased separately?




[TODO: Ben—
> I am pretty worried that if I actually point out the physical injuries sustained by some of the smartest, clearest-thinking, and kindest people I know in the Rationalist community as a result of this sort of thing, I'll be dismissed as a mean person who wants to make other people feel bad.

I assumed he was talking about Katie's institutionalization, not SRS

> where gaslighting escalated into more tangible harm in a way that people wouldn't know about by default. In contrast, people already know that bottom surgery is a thing; you just have reasons to think it's Actually Bad—reasons that your friends can't engage with if we don't know what you're talking about. It's already bad enough that Eliezer is being so pointlessly cagey; if everyone does it, then we're really doomed.

Ben's actual worry—
> "saying the wrong keywords causes people in this conversation to start talking about me using the wrong keywords in ways that cause me illegible, hard-to-trace damage."

> marginalization happens through processes designed to be hard for the "rider" in the horse-rider system to see. This makes the threat model hard to communicate, which puts the rider in a double-bind with respect to things like courage, because it's dependent on the horse for most of its information.

I thought the conjunction of the "mere worm" rhetoric and the thousands of words of "Here's why your own writing proves that you're wrong, you coward" and the context of Eliezer's own arrogant writing style, should have implied a certain level of conceit/tongue-in-cheekness? (I wouldn't write like this—or, um, pay someone $1000 to read my blog post—for anyone else in the world, but Eliezer is really special to me.) 

I already tried to say this in my message of the seventh, but let me try again more explicitly: I agree that the rationalists are very good at free speech norms. Ozy is writing in good faith! There is no concealed blade! I can totally do my thing without getting shouted down for heresy! I am not a victim of anything!

I do, however, think there's a subtler failure mode than "heretics get shouted down", namely, "heretics have to put up with spurious isolated demands for rigor, logical rudeness, conversation-halters, &c., such that the community doesn't update or updates slower than it could have."

This is, of course, a much harder problem to solve, because "Speaker gets shouted down" is easy for third parties to detect as a discourse-norm violation, whereas "Speaker's (polite!) interlocutors are engaging in [motivated continuation](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/L32LHWzy9FzSDazEg/motivated-stopping-and-motivated-continuation)" is a subtle judgment call that a lot of third-parties are going to get wrong. But if and to the extent that such a thing does happen in our community—and you shouldn't take my word for it—I think it's causally downstream of silencing going on elsewhere in the trash fire that is Society (which we're not isolated from).

Ben—
> It seems like for the socioeconomic class likely to become Rationalists, employability increasingly requires the kind of sensitivity to social threat and opportunity that makes people easily silenceable in the absence of a clear distinct threat, even in the Bay, even for programmers (though not 100% yet), since workplaces have become more politicized and less about getting something specific done

Except people are actually super hypocritical about this: everyone knows to say that men are Bad, but only weird nerds who Take Ideas Seriously (e.g., me, Scott Aaronson, Jessica, Ziz), take the idea seriously. In a world where we know that men are Bad, but women are Good, and that women are people who identify as women ... well, for normal, well-adjusted men, it makes no difference. But for the nerds who live in a world made out of words, there's a natural incentive to cross the border between a lonely straight man with no intersectionality points, and a thrice-oppressed lesbian trans woman with three intersectionality points—and thus, a seat at the Blue table.

The gender-refugees story is story is the extra ingredient we need to make sense of the new and crazier thing that's going on in Current Year Berkeley: the escaping-Bad-man-status incentive gradient, and decreasing stigma (or even a status boost in sufficiently social-justice-converged subcultures), make for a much lower threshold of required AGPness before transitioning starts to look like a good idea—and potentially none at all (see Ziz again).

I really did not anticipate that the controversial part of "men who fantasize about being actual women for sexual reasons" would be the phrase "actual women"!

I've got some exciting open-source events coming up (first the Rust team all-hands, then I'm giving a talk at !!Con West) where I want to make friends and impress people, and I'm a little bit worried about being revealed as a thought-criminal earlier than I intended. Among the ~30 !!Con speakers (they're lightning talks), I count 3 trans women, three obvious men who prefer they/them pronouns, and one obvious woman who prefers they/them pronouns.

Karaoke night was fun, but social-justice culture has me on edge (the little things; like, Manish showed me this funny Tweet on his phone, and my uncontrolled facial reaction was probably more disdainful than mirthful, and I don't know how to calculate if or how much I'm being socially penalized these little things)

I've lived in the "rationalist" cult-bubble my entire adult life, and I don't know the rules for forming cross-cult alliances. If some of the social-justicey open-source people seem like they're starting to Accept me and invite me to things, can I say to one of them, "Look, I'm worried about being socially rejected for ideological reasons; maybe we should talk about this privately now rather than risking Drama later"? If that doesn't work (and it works with my "rationalist" friends, for all their other faults), then what do people do??

My original fantasy-plan was to strive for Acceptance, then suddenly stop preference-falsifying on Twitter (rough draft) at an opportune moment (after securing compiler-team membership or another conference speaker slot) as a calculated bid for glorious Damore- or Lindsay-Shepherd-like free-speech martyrdom. (If you don't preference-falsify at first when you're a nobody, then you can be quietly frozen out, but if you get Accepted first, then getting kicked out is a loud event that forces the bastards to make their ideological litmus test visible.)

But I'm pretty sure the martyrdom-seeking intuition is Actually Bad. (They're not bastards; they're people exactly like me who read different books in a different order.)

After more private discussion with Eliezer (after rounding up Michael Vassar, Ben Hoffman, and Sarah Constantin for social proof), and fighting Alicorn's Discord server three times, at this point I'm leaning towards just giving up on the so-called "rationalist" community. We had an entire goddamned Sequence about the hidden Bayesian structure of language and cognition and why "I can define a word/category any way I want" is generalized anti-epistemology.

I think something got derailed in our last discussion. I begged you to remind your readers about the meta-level epistemology-insight about hidden-Bayesian-structure-of-language-and-cognition thing, and somehow we ended up in an object-level discussion about which categories to use, with you appealing to "mental health benefits to trans people."

I'm not upset about the object-level. What I care about is this: as an aspiring epistemic rationalist, seeking out the map that reflects the territory, to cut through to the correct answer in a single movement, I have a moral duty to not care about people's feelings when forming my world-model. I can certainly not-talk about unpleasant ideas or concepts when they're not too relevant when in the presence of non-rationalists who might feel hurt. But when I'm being serious? With people who call themselves fucking aspiring rationalists? Trying to make sense of the world? The correct amount of "mild inconveniences and slight cognitive friction" to accept for utilitarian reasons is zero.

Like, I want to be fair and give credit where credit is due. Like, rationalists are very good at free speech norms. The Alicorner discussion actually made some progress! But ... not enough progress?

You wrote, "some compromise solution like always using 'sex: male/female' to mean 'biological sex' and 'gender: man/woman' to mean 'self-identified gender' would, if it were universally understood and agreed upon, be pretty fair and optimal."

But have you fucking tried trying to talk about biological sex with Berkeley psuedo-rationalists? They won't fucking acknowledge it.

I said, "I need language that asymmetrically distinguishes between the original thing that already exists without having to try, and the artificial thing that's trying to imitate it to the limits of available technology."

Kelsey said, "[T]he people getting surgery to have bodies that do 'women' more the way they want are mostly cis women [...] I don't think 'people who'd get surgery to have the ideal female body' cuts anything at the joints."

Elena said, "'the original thing that already exists without having to try' sounds fake to me" ... and gets 4 "+1" emoji.

And like ... I don't know, these motherfuckers talk a good game about "charity", but when I'm clearly trying to talk about the 'biological sex' thing, and I get a response about women who don't like their own bodies ... I don't think the principle of charity is being applied?! I haven't sent you the whole transcript; you could argue that maybe I'm taking too much out of context and that the full context would be mitigating? I want to be fair and make sure that I'm not strawmanning, but I can't make sense of this; I don't know how to perform the mental contortions to make it look like people are speaking in good faith; I don't trust that these people are trying to help me reason about reality

I'm still pretty horrified that the sticking point in discussions seems to have been not the AGP etiology itself (which is what I was focusing on in 2016/2017), but the category-boundaries-are-arbitrary "insight." So it's not just that we failed to break the irrationalist trans ideology: we actually invented something arguably worse! (Ordinary trans activists at least try to make (confused) truth claims; we invented a fully general counteragument against truth claims that's all the more dangerous thanks to the virtue of a very narrow kind of technical correctness.)

> point out to him your sympathies regarding his mental breakdown under soft political persecution and silencing, make it clear that you are not requesting that he now or at any time in the future do anything in public regarding gender issues, and ask him to remember that you have recently been mentally incarcerated more than under similar political pressure (applied in the name of the mental health needs of non-specific people many of whom are in the same natural category as yourself) that he is totally forgiven for participating in it, but that you would like to discuss the shared aspect of your circumstances  face to face, and maybe both consider not posting anything online for a couple weeks.

> That was a fairly destructive move to pull without consulting me, but OK, you played it and I will run with it.

(Notwithstanding how it's bad that I've been leaning on you for social proof way too much, I've been writing with the assumption that the author of the Sequences still cares about the common interest of many causes. I can see the "MIRI exists, that was all the raising-the-sanity-waterline project turned out to be good for; I don't have any teaching duties besides my not-explicitly-lying Wizard's Oath" CDT logic, but ... ugh, really? I can't be the one to suggest it.)



You write:

    Your annual reminder that Slate Star Codex is not and never was alt-right, every real stat shows as much, and the primary promoters of this lie are sociopaths who get off on torturing incredibly nice targets like Scott A.

Suppose the one were to reply: "Using language in a way you dislike, openly and explicitly and with public focus on the language and its meaning, is not lying. The proposition you claim false (Scott Alexander's explicit advocacy of a white ethnostate?) is not what the speech is meant to convey—and this is known to everyone involved, it is not a secret. You're not standing in defense of truth if you insist on a word, brought explicitly into question, being used with some particular meaning. Now, maybe as a matter of policy, you want to make a case for language like 'alt-right' being used a certain way. Well, that's a separate debate then. But you're not making a stand for Truth in doing so, and your opponents aren't tricking anyone or trying to."

How would you begin to respond to this? That's not a rhetorical question: I'm actually curious.

My model of Sequences-era 2009!Eliezer says, "This is an attempt to sneak in connotations by performing a categorization and trying to avoid the burden of having to justify it with an appeal-to-arbitrariness conversation-halter. Go read 'A Human's Guide to Words,' and if you've already read it, then you're being incredibly intellectually dishonest and not worth my time to interact with."

But I have no idea what 2019!Eliezer says.

You wrote to me on 28 November:

    The notion of a lie is as sancrosanct as the notion of a truth, and you do not get to say 'lie' when somebody is doing something that you think might tempt somebody to add on a lie as an additional act. [...] 'Lying' is for per se direct falsehoods.

What direct falsehood is being asserted by Scott's detractors? I don't think anyone is claiming that, say, Scott identifies as alt-right (not even privately), any more than anyone is claiming that trans women have two X chromosomes. Sneer Club has been pretty explicit in their criticism (examples: 1 2) that the Culture War thread harbors racists (&c.) and possibly that Scott himself is a secret racist, with respect to a definition of racism that includes the belief that there are genetically-mediated population differences in the distribution of socially-relevant traits and that this probably has decision-relevant consequences should be discussable somewhere.

And this is just correct: e.g., "The Atomic Bomb Considered As Hungarian High School Science Fair Project" favorably cites Cochran et al.'s genetic theory of Ashkenazi achievement as "really compelling." Scott is almost certainly "guilty" of the category-membership that the speech against him is meant to convey—it's just that Sneer Club got to choose the category. The correct response to the existence of a machine-learning classifer that returns positive on both Scott Alexander and Richard Spencer is not that the classifier is "lying" (what would that even mean?), but that the classifier is not very useful for understanding Scott Alexander's effects on the world.

Of course, Scott is great and we should defend him from the bastards trying to ruin his reputation, and it's plausible that the most politically convenient way to do that is to pound the table and call them lying sociopaths rather than engaging with the substance of their claims, much as how someone being tried under an unjust law might dishonestly plead "Not guilty" to save their own skin rather than tell the whole truth and hope for jury nullification.

But political convenience comes at a dire cost to our common interest! There's a proverb you once failed to Google, which runs something like, "Once someone is known to be a liar, you might as well listen to the whistling of the wind."

Similarly, once someone is known to vary the epistemic standards of their public statements for political convenience (even if their private, unshared thoughts continue to be consistently wise)—if they say categorizations can be lies when that happens to help their friends, but seemingly deny the possibility of categorizations being lies when that happens to make them look good ...

Well, you're still somewhat better off listening to them than the whistling of the wind, because the wind in various possible worlds is presumably uncorrelated with most of the things you want to know about, whereas clever arguers who don't tell explicit lies are very constrained in how much they can mislead you. But it seems plausible that you might as well listen to any other arbitrary smart person with a blue check and 20K followers. I remain,

> >
>
> If the statement "Pronouns aren't lies" has the same type of misapprehension-forming impact on the listener as "Scott Alexander is a racist" or "Slate Star Codex is an alt-right blog" then

Wait! That's not the analogy I'm trying to make!

What I'm trying to say is, whether "You're not standing in defense of truth if you insist on a word, brought explicitly into question, being used with some particular meaning" makes sense as a response to "X isn't a Y" shouldn't depend on the specific values of X and Y.

Your behavior the other month made it look like you think that "You're not standing in defense of truth if ..." is a valid response when, say, X = "Caitlyn Jenner" and Y = "woman."

I'm saying that whether or not it's a valid response, we should, as a matter of local validity, apply the same standard when X = "Scott Alexander" and Y = "racist."

The preceding three paragraphs are glossing over some details, and I totally understand if you want to disagree with the exact way I've formulated them! (Like, maybe you think it's inappropriate that I'm focusing on category-membership even though your explicit statement was about pronouns. It's important to notice that! We may be living in different mental universes with respect to how Gricean implicature works!)

But ... I'm not claiming that Eliezer's statement that "Pronouns aren't lies" has the same type of misapprehension-forming impact on the listener as Sneer Club's statement that "Scott Alexander is a racist." That's just not what the analogy was trying to do!


But like, does anyone understand what the fuck could possibly be going on in Eliezer's head? I've spent thousands of words with lots of direct links and quotes to his own writings from ten years ago trying to explain that there's a problem where people who call themselves "rationalists" are somehow very intent on playing clever definition-hacking mind games to make it artificially expensive to express the idea that humans cannot change sex (given current technology), and that I think he could fix the problem because people might listen to him when they don't listen to me. I agree that trans issues aren't important, but I also think that if you're doing systematically correct reasoning, you should get the right answer even when the issue isn't important.

I think I've been pretty explicit! And today Eliezer is chastising me and Ben for not having enough empathy to realize that people live in different mental universes. And like—I agree that people live in different mental universes! But—that seems bizarrely nonresponsive to the thousands of words I wrote explaining the problem! You see it, right?! What is there left for me to say?

Michael—
> I think that if Zack is having difficulties it would be ideal if we could move this ahead without him. Needless to say, he doesn't need to feel any responsibility and has done all that could be asked of him and more to cause this project to survive unanticipated difficulties.  Right now, I don't think there's much help he can offer except for periodic pushes, like the current one, for the rest of us to keep at it. 



> On my model, it's good to send this because there are two possibilities
> 1) that this demonstrates the independence of our perspectives, which causes them to count as additional evidence for a proposition, and that means that this makes us more convincing
> 2) that this shows a lack of unity, a failure to present a United Front, which is bad, because Arguments are Soldiers, and thus we are making ourselves less convincing. 
> In the latter case, Eliezer is dead to us and it would probably help if we were to bury something in a funeral. In the former case, our friends are still in there, and the way to reach them isn't by balancing the social forces arrayed against them.

I'm pretty sure I can directly link to Ozy and Kelsey speaking favorably of literal self-identity, not gating on hormones or social passability. And just ... I keep rereading this stuff trying to check that I'm not misreading, because I can't take it seriously. They're just fucking with me, right???? I don't harbor ill will against any individual people, but I just can't share a rationalist community with this level of mindfuckery.

I mean, okay, if that's what you want to do. (If the outcome of these hopefully-not-too-annoying emails is that Eliezer Yudkowsky feels more social/political constraints on what he can say rather than less, then this horribly backfired and you should forget we said anything.)

"How would you feel if someone else tried to get away with the 'hill of meaning in defense of validity' appeal-to-arbitrariness conversation-halter against you when you were trying to use language to reason about something you actually cared about (like defending Scott, who is great)? If it would be logically rude in that context, maybe it was also logically rude the first time?"

Michael
> We have all been essentially trained to believe that we are not entitled to voice our complaints. When someone backs off, we are prone to loosing confidence and to think that maybe we shouldn't be talking with them, yet function institutions have existed in the past, and if people aren't adhering to the normal of functional institutions, we have to not allow that to cause us to stop adhering to those norms. Therefore, we should keep doubling down with reminders regarding the rules for discussion. If he decides to not play, we should establish that to ourselves with no plausible deniability and move on. 


 "An alternative categorization system is not an error", like all appeals-to-arbitrariness, is necessarily what you called a symmetric weapon: the same form of argument works just as well for being mean to our friends as it does for being nice to our friends. The best the good guys can hope for is to win by coincidence. (Assuming there's any way to distinguish who the "good guys" are, if alternative systems that draw the "good guys" category boundary differently aren't in error, assuming there's any way to distinguish what "winning" is, if alternative systems that draw the "winning" category boundary differently aren't in error, &c.)

If someone showed up at a Less Wrong meetup claiming that they had an invisible dragon, I would expect ordinary meetup attendees to exert social pushback against the dragon-claimant: "Dude, that doesn't make sense. Beliefs need to be falsifiable! You should read the Sequences!" I would even expect the social pushback to be strong enough such that the claimant would eventually either internalize the "Beliefs need to be falsifiable" idea or get the fuck out of my rationalist community.

If I show up at a Less Wrong meetup claiming that people don't have invisible genders, and I get social pushback ... then I'm not really sure what my options are other than writing off the entire community.

     

I'm not extremely troubled by my minor disagreements with you. All the actually-smart high-status old-timers I've talked to (you, Eliezer, Anna, Michael Vassar, Sarah Constantin, Ben Hoffman, Steve Rayhawk, &c.) clearly see the hidden-Bayesian-structure-of-language-and-cognition thing I'm trying to point at. Even if you say it's mere awkwardness and not a serious epistemology problem, at least you acknowledge the awkwardness, which is more than I've gotten out of Kelsey.

The thing I find extremely troubling is that none of the old-timers who clearly understand the thing are willing to say so loudly and in public where other people can learn from it, with the exceptions of Ben and Vassar—and Vassar's in-community status is getting debased. (Sarah drafted a post supporting me on the categories thing, but decided not to publish it.)

You wrote about the "inevitable" forces pointing towards a future guided by the beauty of our weapons, where good arguments eventually win out over bad arguments. What if you were too optimistic? What if good arguments don't win—not even in the so-called "rationalist" community?

I think "Categories should carve reality at the joints to help us make efficient probabilistic predictions" is a better argument than "Categories capture tradeoffs you care about; they don't have to carve reality at the joints if that makes people sad." Right now, the better argument is losing. Unless something changes, the better argument will continue to lose. In other words, we live in a world where reason doesn't work. If we live in a world where reason doesn't work, then we're dead. If we can't get consensus on easy problems (Q: Can men become women by means of saying so? A: No. Why would you think that?), then how are we supposed to solve AI alignment?



> I don't know if you read the glowfic that Alicorn and Kelsey write. There was a scene in one of their LoTR things where some elves capture some orcs. They learn that the orcs are nice people deep down, evil god Melkor has forced the orcs to swear an oath to serve him and do evil all the time and kill people. And for complicated magic reasons, orcs cannot break oaths, or else they are tormented by unbearable pain. So even though the orcs are nice, they are compelled to serve Melkor, who usually wants them to kill people and stuff.

> After a while, our hero comes up with a solution. She founds a religion on the spot devoted to a Deist-style omnipotent observer God, who just so happens to also be named Melkor. Deist-Melkor just wants people to live their lives and be happy and help others. She claims that the orcs did swear an oath to follow Melkor, but they didn't specify *which* Melkor, and since her Melkor is omnipotent he takes preference over evil-Melkor. The orcs (who are all kind of dumb, and also incentivized toward highly motivated reasoning) agree this makes sense, this seems to satisfy whatever magic enforces their oath, and so they go off and live their lives and be happy and help others.

> Part of this story is that occasionally some people will approach the orcs and be like "This is kind of dumb, right, on some level you know you're supposed to be following evil Melkor", and this information is infohazardous to orcs and can put them in unbearable pain (or compel them to kill people and stuff) until they're able to talk themselves out of it.

> I asked Alicorn whether this was an intentional metaphor for this discussion, since I know you've been talking to her about it. She says no. But it captures a lot of how I think about this. Are the *real rationalists!!!* the ones who go to the orcs and tell them that they obviously meant to serve evil Melkor and so should be in constant pain all the time? Are those the people who are """winning"""?  Or would saying that just be pointlessly harming them for no reason?

> I couldn't care less about transgender.

Michael—
> I agree that he isn't, but it seems Important to me that if we think he isn't interested we actually establish common knowledge that we consider him at this point to be choosing to try to be a cult leader. 


I was kind of considering replying, "That's totally understandable! Would a financial incentive change your decision? For a two-hour meeting, I'd be happy to pay up to $4000 to you or your preferred charity. If you don't want the money, then sure, yes, let's table this. I hope you're having a good day."

But, maybe I shouldn't do this because the "Volunteer to throw four-figure amounts of money at people in order to get them to hear me out" move is simultaneously personally degrading, psychologically coercive, extremely socially weird, and bad for my economic self-interest.
 
https://meltingasphalt.com/tears/

commit a5316c23ac837c004922e2d192c2bea914a21ebc
Author: Zack M. Davis <zack@thecoalition.com>
Date:   Tue Mar 19 00:27:53 2019 -0700

    DIS-327: broker-facing duplicate-quote route
    
    It's sharing code with the internal resïssue-quote endpoint, because
    that's convenient.